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Mobile-Home Mania? Protecting Procedurally
Fair Arbitration in a Consumer Microcosm
AMY J. SCHMITZ*

What do tornados and arbitrationhave in common?
They both can be disastrousfor mobile home owners!
I. INTRODUCTION

Why an article about arbitration of disputes involving mobile, or
manufactured, homes (collectively referred to in this Article as "MH"s)? 1
Many courts and commentators have critiqued arbitration in consumer and
employment contexts in which there is uneven bargaining power.2 This
Article focuses on the unique consumer microcosm of MH transactions. This
is because onerous arbitration provisions in these transactions augment the
burdens already threatening MHs' great potential for providing low-income
* Amy J. Schmitz, Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of
Law. I would like to thank Christopher Drahozal, Stephen Ware, and Mark Loewenstein
for their helpful and insightful comments. I would also like to thank Emily Lauck,
Christian Earle, and Jennifer Owens for their research assistance, as well as Jennifer
Chang and Stacey Huss for their help with final reference verifications.
1 See NEIGHBORHOOD REINVESTMENT CORP. & THE JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV., AN EXAMINATION OF MANUFACTuRED HOUSING AS A
available at
(2002),
2
STRATEGY
ASSET-BUILDING
COMMUNiTY-AND
2
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/communitydevelopment/W0 1 1_apgar.et_al.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter NRC EXAMINATION]. These
terms are often used interchangeably, but "manufactured homes" are factory built in
accordance with the code created by the Office of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD), pursuant to the 1974 Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards
Act (MHCSSA). Id. I collectively refer to mobile and manufactured homes as "MH"s for
convenience. I do not include under this term "modular" or "panelized" homes built or
assembled on-site. See id. (explaining terms).
2 See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against
Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees,
64 UMKC L. REv. 449, 464-67 (1996) (critiquing FAA application in uneven bargaining
contexts).
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housing. 3 These arbitration provisions thwart MH safety by frustrating
consumers' attempts to obtain remedies for MH defects. Furthermore, courts'
strict enforcement of arbitration provisions under the Federal Arbitration Act
(FAA),4 or similar state law, has caused many MH owners to lose their
homes to creditors while futilely seeking warranty remedies in arbitration.
Indeed, arbitration of MH warranty claims is ripe for reform. 5 Even the
Supreme Court has grappled with consumer challenges of arbitration clauses
in MH contracts. 6 This is partly due to the hybrid nature of MHs. MHs are
houses in functional, financial, and emotional ways, yet are unique from sitebuilt homes because they are factory-built on permanent chassis. Factory
production makes MHs 20-30% less expensive than comparable site-built
units, even taking into account MH transportation and installation costs.7
MHs, therefore, have become an important source of housing for individuals
with low incomes. MHs' mobility, however, also subjects them to personal
property warranty and finance laws geared to govern widgets, not homes.
To make matters worse, MH sales resemble "old-fashioned, highpressure auto deal[s]," which often involve stark power differentials between
"insider" manufacturers, retailers, and lenders and "outsider" consumers. 8
3 See MANUFACTURED HOUSING RESEARCH ALLIANCE, TECHNOLOGY ROADMAPPING

FOR MANUFACTURED HOUSING 1-14 (2003) [hereinafter ROADMAPPING]. "Affordable
housing" is a debatable label, but I use it in this Article to generally refer to homes that
are within the budgets of many low-income consumers.
4 Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 9 U.S.C. (2000)).
5 See infra Part I.B (discussing the plight of MH owners). This Article focuses on
MH arbitration but similar arguments apply in the larger debate regarding consumer and
employment arbitration.
6 See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447-54 (2003) (eluding
the question of whether Green Tree can contractually preclude class relief through its
arbitration clauses in MH contracts by holding that arbitrators must first determine
whether the clauses preclude class arbitration); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531
U.S. 79, 90-91 (2000) (finding that Truth in Lending Act (TILA) claims under a MH
financing agreement may be subject to binding arbitration under the FAA, and consumer
had failed to prove that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive); see also infra Part
IV (discussing courts' struggles with enforcement of arbitration agreements).
7 NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 2-3. A 1998 HUD study indicated that
building a 2,000-square-foot MH costs 61% as much as a comparable site-built home. Id.
at 2.
8 Kathy Mitchell, In Over Our Heads: Predatory Lending and Fraud in
Manufactured Housing, CONSUMERS UNION Sw. REG'L OFFICE PUBLIC POLICY SERIES,
No. 1, at 2 (2002), at http://www.consumerunion.org/pdf/mh/over/report.pdf (last visited
Sept. 23, 2004). For purposes of simplicity, I use "MH insiders" to refer to MH
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Many MH insiders use this power to impose onerous form arbitration
provisions in consumer contracts. 9 These provisions often curtail or
extinguish consumers' statutory warranty rights. They also may restrict
consumers' contract remedies, but allow lenders to judicially foreclose on
MHs. 10 Consumers then risk losing their homes in court while struggling to
arbitrate warranty claims.
That is not to say that arbitration is inappropriate for resolving MH
warranty disputes. Arbitration can be a flexible process that eases judicial
caseloads and provides more disputant satisfaction than litigation."1
Arbitration also may foster efficiency, which insiders may pass on to
consumers through lower prices. Insider-controlled arbitrations, however,
should preserve consumers' access to remedies for MH defects. Furthermore,
current uncertainties regarding which arbitration procedures will withstand
judicial scrutiny in MH cases sap arbitration efficiencies and augment threats
12
to MHs' affordable housing potential.
Concern regarding consumers' lack of access to warranty remedies
prompted Congress to enact the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of
2000 (MHIA). 13 The Act calls for the Office of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) to establish a program for resolving disputes among
MH manufacturers, retailers, and installers regarding responsibility for repair
of MH defects that are reported within one year of MH installation. 14 Each
state must implement a program in compliance with HUD standards by

manufacturers, lenders, and retailers as a general group, recognizing all parties falling
under this umbrella are not necessarily industry savvy, and do not necessarily enjoy
strong bargaining power.
9 Id. at 10; see also NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 2-19.
lOSee infra notes 114-25 and accompanying text (discussing insider-imposed

provisions).
11 See, e.g., Cameron L. Sabin, The Adjudicatory Boat Without a Keel: Private
Arbitration and the Need for Public Oversight of Arbitrators, 87 IOwA L. REV. 1337,

1359-62 (2002) (debating the efficiencies of arbitration); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of
Public Policy: The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 259, 265-69

(1990) (identifying the benefits of arbitration); Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from
Mandatory Rules: PrivatizingLaw Through Arbitration, 83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 708-11

(1999) (discussing the roles of private choice in arbitration).
12 See infra Part IV (explaining disagreement of courts).
13 Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-569, 114 Stat.
2997 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (amending the National
Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (MHCSSA)).
14 Id. § 610.
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December 2005 or HUD will impose a program in that state.15 On March 10,
2003, HUD requested comments on all aspects of the program, including
who and what claims the program should include, what dispute resolution
process it should employ, and what procedures that process should require. 16
This Article provides input regarding the HUD program. It also calls for
broader protection of procedural fairness in arbitration of- MH disputes.
Although the HUD program aims to create a process for resolving intraindustry disputes among manufacturers, dealers and installers, this Article
proposes that Congress expand the MHIA's aim to require minimum
procedural and remedial standards for arbitration of MH consumer warranty
disputes. This is not, therefore, a call for abolition of arbitration agreements.
Generally, contractual liberty supports parties' freedom to craft arbitration
provisions suited to their transactional needs and contexts. The unique
burdens affecting MH consumers, however, justify creation of mandatory
minimum standards for arbitration of MH warranty claims. These standards
should not eviscerate contractual liberty or undercut efficiencies that make
MHs an affordable home-ownership option. They nonetheless should
preserve fair and affordable means for consumers to obtain remedies for MH
defects.
Part II of this Article explains why MH transactions comprise a unique
microcosm of consumer contracts. As Congress acknowledged in adopting
the MHIA, complexities and burdens of MH ownership are jeopardizing the
potential of MHs within the low-income housing market. Part Il discusses
how some MH insiders' use of form arbitration agreements augments these
burdens by curtailing consumers' warranty rights and remedies, and adding
to financing risks. In Part IV, the Article explores courts' struggles with these
arbitration provisions. Consumers' continual challenges of these provisions
produce uncertain results and sap arbitration's efficiency benefits.
Accordingly, Part V sets forth options for addressing MH consumers'
inadequate access to warranty remedies. Part VI proposes that policymakers
adopt minimum fairness standards for arbitration of MH consumer claims
that seek to protect consumers' MH remedies without draining the efficiency
benefits of arbitration. This proposal is by no means a recipe for the perfect
resolution of MH claims. Nonetheless, it hopes to spark consideration of
procedural reforms for MH arbitrations, and perhaps for other uneven
bargaining contexts as well.
15 Id.
16 Manufactured Housing Dispute Resolution Program: Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 68 Fed. Reg. 11,456 (proposed Mar. 10, 2003) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.
pt. 3286) [hereinafter HUD Notice].
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II. WHY MH TRANSACTIONS COMPRISE AN IMPORTANT MICROCOSM OF
CONSUMER CONTRACTS

MHs serve an important niche in the housing market. 17 They provide an
opportunity for low-income families to enjoy the amenities of
homeownership that these families may not be able to afford in the
traditional real estate market. Furthermore, MHs may be the only option for
18
low-income housing where rental and subsidized housing is scarce.
Congress recognized MHs' potential for affordable housing in adopting the
MHIA, calling on HUD to strengthen MH safety standards and promote the
effective resolution of MH warranty disputes. Complexities and burdens of
MH ownership, however, threaten this potential. In addition, personalty legal
regimes awkwardly govern MH transactions, while many MH consumers fall
prey to high-pressure sales, onerous financing, poor warranty protections,

17 See Amy J. Schmitz, Promoting the Promise Manufactured Homes Providefor
Affordable Housing, 13 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 384, 385-87,
395-99 (2004) (emphasizing the importance of MHs in the affordable housing market
and seeking to spark policymakers' awareness regarding warranty and financing issues
that threaten MHs' potential).
18 See Kevin Jewell, Manufactured Housing Appreciation: Stereotypes and Data,
CONSUMERS
UNION,
at
2
(2003),
at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/mh/Appreciation.pdf (last visited Oct. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter MH Appreciation] (undertaking a study of MH appreciation in order to
promote homeownership for low-income families); see also Kevin Jewell, Raising the
Floor, Raising the Roof: Raising Our Expectations for Manufactured Housing, 6
CONSUMER'S UNION SW. REG'L OFFICE PUBLIC POLICY SERIES, No. 5, at 1 (2003), at
http://www.consumersunion.org/other/mh/raising/raising-exe.htm (last visited Oct. 3,
2004) [hereinafter Raising the Floor] (addressing problems that prevent MHs from
reaching their full potential for low-income families); ROADMAPPING, supra note 3, at 79 (emphasizing the importance of MHs in providing housing to those who would
otherwise be unable to own homes). MH ownership, however, can sometimes turn into a
nightmare due to MH defects. See Dream Home or Nightmare, 63 CONSUMER REP. 2,
Feb. 1998, at 30 [hereinafter Dream Home].
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and zoning restrictions. 19 This has led some MH communities to suffer the
20
ills that traditionally have paralyzed inner-cites.
A. Importance of MHs to the Housing Market
1. Unique Housing OpportunitiesProvided by MHs
Only 24.1% of households in the United States can afford to purchase an
average site-built home, and the nation's stock of cheap rental and subsidized
housing continues to dwindle. 2 1 Low-income families may be able to
purchase MHs, however, because they cost about half as much as
conventional homes. 22 MHs, therefore, accounted for 72% of new lowincome housing from 1997 to 1999.23 This makes MHs the only viable
homeownership option for many with very low incomes. 24 This also makes
MHs an important source of housing for many first-time homebuyers and
retirees. 25 Young families, especially single-parent households, purchase
19 See Raising the Floor, supra note 18, at 1, 24-25 (emphasizing the opportunities
for MH owners to build equity in their homes and enjoy the other benefits enjoyed by
owners of conventional homes); see also Wendy Schermer, Case Note, Mobile Homes:
An Increasingly Important Housing Resource that Challenges Traditional Land Use
Regulation-Geiger v. Zoning Hearing Board of North Whitehall, 60 TEMP. L.Q. 583,
594-97 (1987) (discussing adherence to traditionally poor perceptions of MHs as
aesthetically displeasing drains on public resources).
20 See NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 5-10. But see Cheryl P. Derricotte,
Poverty and Property in the United States: A Primeron the Economic Impact of Housing
Discriminationand the Importance of a U.S. Right to Housing, 40 How. L.J. 689, 700-01
(1997) (noting concern regarding MHs because they "offer little in the way of wealth
accumulation").
21 ROADMAPPING, supra note 3, at 7 (noting a $212,300 average home price in
2001).
22
Id. at 8.
23 Id.; cf. Dream Home, supra note 18, at 32 (reporting that the median household
income of MH dwellers in 1995 was $22,578, compared with $31,416 for all households
nationally); Richard Genz, Mortgage Lending for Manufactured Homes: Maine State
Housing Authority's Experiment, Neighborhood Reinvestment Corp., at 11 (2002), at
http://www.floridahousing.org/ahsc/2003%2OStudy%20Agenda%2ODocs/b_lMaine%2
OMSHA%20MH%2OReport-Genz.pdf (last visited Sept. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Mortgage
Lending] (reporting median MH borrower income was $29,922, which was 66% of the
statewide family median).
24
See ROADMAPPING, supra note 3, at 7.
25 See NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 9-10 (noting the continued dominance
of first-time and retired homebuyers in the MH market but speculating that emergence of
more high-end MHs will spark MH purchasing among middle-income families).
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MHs because they provide easy entry into the housing market. 26 In addition,
MH ownership among African Americans and Latinos far exceeds MH
ownership among whites. 27 Meanwhile, conventional homeownership rates
among Latinos and African Americans have slipped, or remained unchanged,
28
and lag well below the rates for whites.
MHs also offer families community-building opportunities. Unlike
apartments, MHs generally provide the privacy and amenities usually
associated with conventional homeownership. MH communities foster
interaction among residents because they often include shared parks or
meeting areas. In addition, MH owners may forge communal connections
because they are generally less transient than apartment dwellers. 2 9 After
30
owners place their MHs, they very rarely move them.
Families may choose MH living because they cannot afford average rent,
or fail to qualify for rental assistance or subsidized housing. Two minimum
wage workers struggle to afford a two-bedroom apartment. 3 1 This may mean
that the government should augment rental assistance programs. It might be
more efficient and cost-effective, however, for policymakers to promote MH
ownership than to expand public liability for housing programs. 32 One study
concluded "that a substantial number of people are being adequately housed

26

1d. at 10.
27 "In fact, Latino and African-American manufactured-home ownership grew at
compound annual growth rates of 6.1 and 4.6 percent, respectively, for the 1985 to 1999
period, well above whites' 2.3 percent." Id. In Texas, for example, nearly half of the
state's MHs house Hispanic families. See Mitchell, supra note 8, at 16.
28 See NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 10. In addition, financial assistance for
housing is unavailable to most aliens. 42 U.S.C. § 1436a (2003). Under federal law,
aliens receive no financial assistance unless they are residents lawfully admitted for
permanent residence or fit another specified category. Id.; see also Mathews v. Diaz, 426
U.S. 67, 79-85 (1976) (holding that Congress has no duty to provide all aliens with the
same benefits provided to citizens); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372-73
(explaining that states may, under some circumstances, discriminate in providing
assistance and resources to noncitizens).
29 See Roger Colton & Michael Sheehan, The Problem of Mass Evictions in Mobile
Home Parks Subject to Conversion, 8 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L.
231, 233 (1999).
30 Id. at 233-34 (reporting study findings that "upwards of 80%" of MH park
residents have remained in their first MH, and approximately 1% of MHs are ever moved
during their lifetimes).
31 ROADMAPPING, supra note 3, at 7.
32 Colton & Sheehan, supra note 29, at 235.
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not be
in their own homes [through MHs] at values-per-unit that could
33
markets."
housing
low-income
public
or
duplicated in either private
Consumers also turn to MHs for shelter in areas where rental housing is
scarce. 34 This is especially true in southern states. In South Carolina, for
example, MHs account for over one-half of new home sales. 35 Furthermore,
36
the scarcity of rental housing is particularly acute in rural areas. This is
problematic despite lower populations in these areas because federal and
state policies are often so focused on urban housing problems that they
neglect rural housing difficulties. 37 Indeed, policymakers cannot ignore
rising safety and financing burdens that threaten MHs' ability to fill niche
needs in the low-income housing market.
2. CongressionalConcernfor Protecting the Housing Potentialof
MHs
Prior to 1974, policymakers did little to protect the quality and safety of
38
MHs, and haphazard state regulations threatened production efficiencies.
The federal government, therefore, enacted the 1974 Manufactured Housing
Construction and Safety Standards Act (MHCSSA).3 9 Pursuant to the Act,
HUD has developed fairly loose MH safety and construction standards that
do not cover problematic areas such as installation and warranty dispute
resolution. 40 These standards aim to contain MH manufacturing costs, 4 1 and

33 Accordingly, if policymakers do not protect this source of housing, the public will
have to bear the costs of increasing government housing assistance and availability of
subsidized housing. See id.
34 ROADMAPPING, supra note 3, at 7.
35 H. Guyton Murrell, Mortgages on Mobile Homes: How Secure is Your Secured
Interest?, 11 S.C. LAW. 40, 41 (2000).
36 See Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REv. 273, 319-21 (2003).
37
Id. at 320-21.
38 See Neal R. Peirce & Patti Leitner, Mobile Homes May Have Come of Age, But
Builders Say Regulations Haven't, 14 THE NAT'L J. 913, 913-14 (1982).
39 Id. at 913-14. See generally Gianakakos v. Commodore Home Sys. Inc., 727
N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (dismissing a claim that MH violated state MH
construction and safety regulations to the extent that the federal standards preempted state
regulations).
40 See Dream Home, supra note 18, at 31, 34 (lamenting weaknesses of HUD MH
standards and HUD's failure to comprehensively review these rules for the past 23
years); see also Peirce & Leitner, supra note 38, at 914.
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incorporate the MH industry's practice by adopting about 85% of their
chosen code. 4 2 Some complain that these standards do not adequately protect
MH dwellers with respect to fire and wind safety, energy efficiency,
warranty regulation, and chemical usage in MH production. 43 Moreover,
consumers struggle to obtain remedies for defects and deficient warranty
service due to the "blame game" MH dealers, manufacturers, and installers
play to escape liability for MH defects. 44 With MH insiders blaming each
other for warranty problems, no party accepts responsibility for fixing
defects.
This criticism of the MHCSSA sparked Congress to enact the MHIA.4 5
The MHIA aims to provide fair and efficient means for resolving warranty
claims, and mandates the development of regulations for safe installation of
MHs. With respect to dispute resolution, the MHIA seeks to end the "blame
game" among MH insiders. 4 6 It requires each state to implement "a dispute
resolution program for the timely resolution of disputes between
manufacturers, retailers, and installers of manufactured homes regarding
responsibility, and for the issuance of appropriate orders, for the correction or
repair of defects in manufactured homes that are reported during the 1-year
period beginning on the date of installation. '47 If a state fails to implement
such a program by December 2005, then HUD must mandate program

41 See Peirce & Leitner, supra note 38, at 913-14. HUD has been caught in the
struggle between consumers calling for more stringent regulations and industry groups
warning that stricter regulations will exclude buyers from the market. Id.
42 See id. (reporting on the emphasis on cost-savings pursuant to revisions that
began in 1979); see also Dream Home, supra note 18, at 34 (lamenting the weaknesses of
HUD's MH standards).
43 Peirce & Leitner, supra note 38, at 914 (noting complaints that "[w]hatever
industry wants, industry gets").
44 In the early 1980s, the FTC reported that warranty service problems were "a
persistent and widespread problem." Id. (noting lack of warranty remedies for common
defects such as leaky roofs, buckling walls and sagging floors, as well as for major health
concerns caused by chemicals used in MH production that cause respiratory and other
problems for MH dwellers).
45 Manufactured Housing Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-569, 114 Stat.
2997 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (amending the MHCSSA).
46 42 U.S.C. § 5422(g) (2000); see also HUD Notice, supra note 16, at 11,452-53
(describing general parameters of the dispute resolution program, and calling for input
regarding specifics).
47 42 U.S.C. § 5422(c)(12).
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requirements. 4 8 HUD is in the early stages of gathering input regarding all
49
aspects of the program.
B. Complexities and Burdens Affecting MH Transactions
1. The Law's Failureto Respond to Warranty and Financing

Difficulties
MHs stand at the crossroads of real and personal property. Although
owners rarely relocate their MHs after placement, the law often treats them
50
as personalty because they are factory built and moved to a resting site.
Accordingly, courts generally hold that MH purchases are sales of goods,
governed by states' adoptions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(UCC) instead of real estate law. 5 1 In addition, MHs generally remain
personalty because most owners place them on rented land or do not
sufficiently affix them to owned land. This means that, instead of real estate
of
mortgage and recording statutes, UCC Article 9 and/or state certificate
52
financing.
MH
of
securitization
govern
title (COT) laws generally
48 42 U.S.C. § 5422(g) (stating that HUD may implement the program itself or
through an appropriate agent).
49 In addition to the MHIA dispute resolution provisions, the Act created a privatesector consensus committee to recommend and update HUD MH quality and
manufacturing standards. The Act also requires states to establish installation standards
that meet HUD's minimum requirements. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5404, 5422; see also
Manufactured Housing Institute, Summary of the Manufactured Housing Improvement
at
106-569,
P.L
Act
http://www.mfghome.org/lib/showtemp-detail0l.asp?id=106&cat=govt (last visited Sept.
23, 2004). Some have voiced concern that MH insiders will control HUD's creation of
these installation standards. See Peirce & Leitner, supra note 38, at 914 (noting the
dominance of MH insiders).
50
See supra text accompanying notes 6-7 (defining MHs as factory-built on
chassis); see also NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 2.

51 1 BARKLEY

CLARK & CHRISTOPHER SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES

§ 2:26 (2003).
52 See George v. Commercial Credit Corp., 440 F.2d 551, 553-54 (7th Cir. 1971)
(applying Wisconsin law's tests for determining when MHs become realty, focusing on
physical annexation to land, adaptation to that land, and parties' intent to affix personalty
to the land); see also 11 RONALD A. ANDERSON & LARY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102:76 (3d ed. 1999) (defining "manufactured-home
transaction" as "a secured transaction in which the home is the primary collateral or in
which the secured creditor has a purchase-money security interest"); Larry T. Bates,
Certificates of Title in Texas Under Revised Article 9, 53 BAYLOR L. REv. 735, 754-56
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a. Weakness of PersonalProperty Warranty Protections
Courts hold that the U.S. Constitution does not guarantee decent
housing. 5 3 Federal and state real estate programs nonetheless promote safety
protections and increased financing options for conventional homes. 54 In
addition, both UCC and real estate warranties aim to protect safety. 55 Parties
also may contractually create express warranties, 56 and contract defenses
57
protect consumers from fraudulent or unconscionable agreements.

(2001) (discussing application of Texas Certificate of Title laws to MHs). In many states,
MH owners and lenders must comply with state certificate of title laws specific to MHs,
or to those generally applicable to motor vehicles. See Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v.
Old Nat'l Bank, 754 N.E.2d 997, 1001-02 (Ind. App. 2001) (noting confusion due to
MHs' classifications as a "good" or a "fixture" depending on affixation to land). MHs
only become fixtures or real property when owners permanently affix them to their own
land. 9 ANDERSON & LAWRENCE, supra, § 9-313:8 (explaining that MHs are not fixtures
when placed on leased land in MH parks).
53 See Derricotte, supra note 20, at 705-08 (noting the "crisis level" lack of safe and
affordable housing in the United States and subsequently proposing a Constitutional
amendment guaranteeing the right to housing as a necessary remedy).
54 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072-83 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(discussing Congressional enactment of housing and sanitary codes for real estate and
implying a warranty of habitability in all such housing leases); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478
A.2d 202, 207-11 (Vt. 1984) (discussing the evolution of real estate law to protect the
overriding interest in "safe, sanitary and comfortable housing," and explaining the
warranties and remedies thus available under state law).
55 See 1 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 51, § 2:26 (stating that, with respect to the
warranties of merchantability under the UCC and of habitability under real estate law,
"[t]he legal results are pretty much the same"); Javins, 428 F.2d at 1072-82 (recognizing
an implied warranty of habitability in the landlord/tenant context and warranty of fitness
in home construction contracts); Gianakakos v. Commodore Home Sys. Inc., 727
N.Y.S.2d 806, 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (applying UCC Article 2 to contract for
purchase of a MH).
56 U.C.C. § 2-316 (2004); see also Davis v. Tazewell Place Assoc., 492 S.E.2d 162,
163-66 (Va. 1997) (holding enforceable an express warranty of workmanlike quality
regarding construction and sales of a townhome); Rouse v. Brooks, 383 N.E.2d 666, 66869 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding that express warranties in real estate purchase agreement
did not merge with the deed, but finding the parol evidence rule excluded a claim for
breach of an alleged oral warranty made by the sellers prior to the execution of the
purchase agreement).
57 See Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 730-31 (Ala. 2002) (finding contract law
defenses such as unconscionability may be applied to invalidate an arbitration agreement
contained in a MH contract within the scope of the FAA); Snow v. Corsica Constr. Co.,
329 A.2d 887, 888-89 (Pa. 1974) (noting that a contract to convey real estate may be
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Nonetheless, real estate law is more protective than general personalty
law of housing safety. Conventional homeowners also seem to enjoy more
bargaining power than MH consumers to prevent contractual dissipation of
warranty protections. For example, courts have established common law
liability for implied warranties of habitability in home construction contracts
that extend to parties beyond immediate home sellers. 58 Many courts,
however, preclude consumers from recovering against manufacturers for
economic losses due to breach of UCC implied warranties in the absence of
contractual privity. 59 In addition, MH consumers must share privity with
manufacturers to recover against them for economic losses under strict
liability in tort. 60 In contrast, many courts do not require conventional
homeowners to show privity in order to recover economic losses due to latent
61
home defects that constitute. -breach of warranty of habitable construction.
Also, courts may more readily enforce warranty disclaimers under UCC
63
Article 262 than under state real estate law.
unenforceable where there is evidence of "fraud or imposition" that would make it unjust
to enforce the contract).
58 See Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 706-11 (Idaho 1966) (applying an
implied warranty of habitability in realty contract); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc.,
154 N.W.2d 803, 805-09 (S.D. 1967) (holding that there exists an implied warranty of
habitability and "reasonable workmanship" that remains in effect subsequent to deed
delivery).
59 See Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc. v. Shivers, 557 S.W.2d 77, 80-81 (Tex. 1977)
(finding that a MH purchaser could recover for personal and economic losses due to
defects where there was privity), questioned in Rocky Mountain Helicopters, Inc. v. Bell
Helicopters Textron, Inc., 24 F.3d 125, 129-30 (10th Cir. 1994); Flory v. Silvercrest
Indus., Inc., 633 P.2d 383, 387-89 (Ariz. 1981) (finding lack of privity precluded
recovery for economic losses by MH consumers who lost their home while failing to
obtain any remedies from the manufacturers regarding defects).
60 See Flory, 633 P.2d at 388 (finding that, privity of contract unnecessary under
strict liability for recovery of physical injury to person or property, but requiring that
privity to recover economic losses under that theory); Nobility Homes of Tex., Inc., 557
S.W.2d at 78-80 (finding that even if economic losses are recoverable for breach of
implied warranty under the UCC without privity, such recovery is not available under
strict liability).
61 Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., 342 N.E.2d 619, 620-21 (Ind. 1976) (extending
warranty protections to subsequent purchasers without contractual privity).
62 See 1 CLARK & SMITH, supra note 51, § 2:26 (noting that Article 2 defenses to
warranty liability clearly apply to MH transactions). Although sellers may limit or
exclude warranty liability under real estate law, it seems Article 2 law may be more clear
with respect to such limitations. See Rawson v. Conover, 20 P.3d 876, 886-87 (Utah
2001) (holding implied and express warranties destroyed when van purchase contract
disclaimed all warranties); DeGrendele Motors, Inc. v. Reeder, 382 S.W.2d 431, 434
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Consumer groups complain that warranty laws do not adequately protect
MH safety. They charge that manufacturers focus on cutting MH
construction costs to the detriment of home quality. 64 A survey conducted by
the Consumer Union in November 2002 indicated that 79% of new MH
owners had experienced problems with their MHs. 65 Consumers lament poor
warranty repair service and weak HUD enforcement of federal construction
and safety standards. 66 Consumers also file a relatively high number of
complaints with the Council of Better Business Bureaus (BBB) against MHrelated businesses. 67 The level of complaints led the BBB to implement a
(Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (per curiam) (enforcing express disclaimer of warranties in a car
purchase order). Still, U.C.C. § 2-316 requires that any waiver of the implied warranty of
merchantability must mention "merchantiblity" and be conspicuous if in writing. But see
Hartman v. Jensen's, Inc., 289 S.E.2d 648, 649 (S.C. 1982) (denying enforcement of an
ambiguous warranty disclaimer in MH sale).
63 See Briarcliffe West Townhouse Owners Ass'n v. Wiseman Constr. Co., 480
N.E.2d 833, 838 (Ell. App. Ct. 1985) (holding that a real estate warranty disclaimer is
invalid unless it is "so clear and so conspicuous that no other reasonable conclusion could
be reached but that the buyer both read and understood the language"); Schoeneweis v.
Herrin, 443 N.E.2d 36, 41-42 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (finding that an "as is" clause in a real
estate contract did not disclaim implied warranties of habitability where it did not refer to
a particular warranty and was not explained); Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 208-09
(Vt. 1984) (stating that the implied warranty of habitability is not waivable by an express
or oral agreement in a residential lease). But see, e.g., Lenawee County Bd. of Health v.
Messerly, 331 N.W.2d 203, 211 (Mich. 1982) (finding that "as is" disclaimer applied to
defects unknown at the time of contracting and thus was enforceable as to a
malfunctioning sewage system).
64 Raising the Floor, supra note 18, at 1 (finding further that "homes are often sold
on floor plan and visual appeal rather then durability and quality").
65 Paper Tiger, Missing Dragon: Poor Service and Worse Enforcement Leave
UNION,
at
CONSUMERS
in
the
Lurch,
Manufactured Homeowners
http://www.consumersunion.org/other/mh/paper-info.htm, at 2 (last visited Oct. 3, 2004)
[hereinafter PaperTiger].
66 Id. at 11. See also Study: PersistentProblems in Manufactured Home Warranty
Service and Enforcement Provoke Customer Ire, CONSUMERS UNION, at
http://www.consumersunion.org/other/mh/paper-pr.htm (Dec. 4, 2002) (last visited Aug.
14, 2004) (reporting a high percentage of dissatisfied MH purchasers due to prevalent
defects and "ineffective regulation of the manufactured housing industry").
67 The 2002 table of consumer complaints provided on the website for the national
BBB council also indicates 2,192 total complaints against businesses categorized as MH
"Parks," "Services," "Equip & Parts," "Rent & Lease," "Transporting," or as
"Mobile/Modular/Manufactured Housing Dealers." 2002 Summary of Complaints,
COUNCIL

OF

BETTER

BUSINESS

BUREAUS,

at

http://www.dr.bbb.org/Drresults/2002WebComplaintsTOB.pdf (last visited Oct. 16,
2003) (noting that this last category ranked 85th among the thousands of business
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program for informal resolution of consumers' warranty-related disputes
against MH manufacturers. 68 At this stage, however, it appears that only two
69
MH manufacturers have agreed to participate in the BBB program.
Consumers struggle to obtain remedies for MH warranty problems. MH
manufacturers and dealers often impose contract terms that exclude or limit
warranties, exclude consequential damages for breach of warranty, severely
cap direct damages, and/or limit consumers' remedies to repair. 70 Some
warranties also exclude coverage of important items, including wall cracks,
leaky faucets, defective doors, and faulty windows. 7 1 Furthermore,
manufacturers' warranties generally do not cover defects caused by faulty
installation, although regulators report that faulty installation accounts for
72
over half of reported MH problems.
Policymakers must make safe and adequate housing a priority. 73 MH
dwellers should, therefore, have reasonable access to remedies and repairs
essential to the safety of their homes. 74 This means they should not lose

categories targeted with complaints). This table captures only a small fraction of total
complaints, however, because it reports only complaints filed with the national BBB.
Furthermore, the table does not list a MH manufacturer category.
68 Right
at
Home,
BBB
DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
WEBSITE,
at
http://www.dr.bbb.org/programs/rah.asp (2003) (last visited Aug. 27, 2004).
69 Dispute Resolution Opportunities, BBB DISPUTE RESOLUTION WEBSrrE, at
http://www.dr.bbb.org/programs/index.asp (2003) (last visited Aug. 27, 2004) (reporting
limited participation by American Homestar and Cavalier Homes).
70 Manufactured Housing: Buying Guide Brochure, Consumers Union's Tips on
Mobile Homes, at http://www.consumersunion.org/other/mh/brochure.htm, at 9-10 (last
visited Aug. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Tips] (reporting common warranty exclusions and
limitations).
71 Id. at 11.
72 See Dream Home, supra note 18, at 31 ("Installation can be a serious safety issue
for manufactured housing."). While it may seem clich6 to mention tornados' destruction
of MHs, the reality is that MHs are especially vulnerable to severe storm damage because
they often are not properly anchored to the ground during installation. Id. at 34; see also
Tips, supra note 70, at 11 (noting items that may void warranties).
73 See Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075-77 (D.C. Cir. 1970)
(extending the implied warranty of habitability to tenants of real estate); King v. Brace,
552 A.2d 398, 399 (Vt. 1988) (holding that a MH tenant may recover under an implied
warranty that ensures "safe, clean and fit" premises for habitation).
74 Hilder v. St. Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 207 (Vt. 1984) (stating that caveat lessee should
no longer be imposed).
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access to defect remedies due to arduous and expensive arbitration
75
provisions.
b. MH FinancingWoes
Differences between MH and real estate lending significantly contribute
to MH contracting and arbitration issues. 76 MH consumers generally lack
access to the conventional home financing market because MHs are not
permanently affixed to land owned by the MH owner. 77 Instead, these
consumers finance the purchase of their MHs with subprime or personal
79
property loans. 78 These MH loans are generally limited and expensive.
They are not backed by the strong secondary market that has developed to
increase accessibility and safety of real estate financing. 80 Instead, state COT
laws and UCC Article 9 (governing MHs) aim to simplify and expand
81
lenders' securitization rights.
75 See infra Part II.B.2.b (discussing one-sided procedures MH insiders generally
include in form arbitration provisions).
76 See Mitchell, supra note 8, at 12 (discussing and reporting findings regarding
predatory financing in the MH industry). Full discussion of these differences is beyond
the scope of this Article.
77
See DAVID S. HILL, BASIC MORTGAGE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-38 (2001)
(providing an introduction to basic real estate transactions).
78 See Derricotte, supra note 20, at 701. In 2000, roughly 78% of new MHs were
financed with chattel loans instead of conventional mortgages. See also Mortgage
Lending, supra note 23, at 2 (stressing disadvantages caused by limited financing
options).
79 See Derricotte, supra note 20, at 701 (lamenting the lack of banking industry or
federal program attention to the limited and high-risk financing of MHs).
80 See HILL, supra note 77, at 35-38 (describing the basics of the secondary market).
The Secretary of HUD has authorized limited federal insurance programs aimed to
promote MH financing. 12 U.S.C. § 1703 (2003); see also Peirce & Leitner, supra note
38, at 915 (noting that HUD had attempted to spark MH lending by insuring lenders
subject to limitations and restrictions). However, most mortgage lenders have stayed out
of the MH lending market due to relatively small loan sizes, less-qualified borrowers,
reports of MH depreciation, and complexities of lending on leased land. Mortgage
Lending, supra note 23, at 2.
81 See 11 ANDERSON & LAWRENCE, supra note 52, § 9-102:76R (defining MH
transactions as secured transactions under UCC Article 9); Edwin E. Smith, An
Introduction to Revised UCC Article 9, in THE NEW ARTICLE 9 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE 17-58 (Corinne Cooper ed., 2d ed. 2000); Richard L. Barnes, Toward a Normative
Framework for the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 TEMP. L. REV. 117, 147-51 (1989)
(emphasizing that UCC Article 9 drafters sought to liberalize lenders' ability to secure
their loans).
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In addition, scarcity and perceived risks of MH financing give MH
lenders particularly disproportionate power over debtors. 82 Dominant MH
83
lending companies face little competition in setting lending practices.
Furthermore, some lenders have recently increased their bargaining power by
tightening lending standards in the wake of rising default rates in the late
1990s. 84 Although lenders' tightened standards may help moderate MH
debtors' default rates, some lenders have used this leverage to impose
especially onerous contract terms.
Interest rates on MH loans typically run two to five percentage points
above those for conventional mortgages. 85 MH lenders also may add "points"
to loan amounts that exceed 5%, but confuse MH borrowers by failing to
include points in the stated "amount financed. ' 86 Some lenders also add high
costs of Homebuyer Protection Plans, Extended Service Warranties, and
credit life insurance in loan amounts. 87 This is especially problematic when
consumers purchase these plans, warranties, and insurance from MH dealers
88
and lenders at elevated costs.
82 See Mitchell, supra note 8, at 12 (noting serious losses suffered by lenders and
describing lender's feelings that "the manufactured housing loan business is like auto
lending, but without the same checks and balances").
83 Issac J. Bailey, The Problem Credit Built, THE SUN NEWS (S.C.), Sept. 29, 2002,
at Al (discussing Conseco's purchase of Green Tree Financial, and Conseco's recent
tightening of its lending, decreasing its share of MH loans from 30 to 18%).
84 Id. For example, one of the largest MH lenders, Conseco, reported credit scores
on its 2001 loans that were roughly the same as scores acceptable to conventional
mortgage lenders. Id. Lenders have become especially circumscribed in financing used
MHs, which make up the bulk of the MH market. See Mortgage Lending, supra note 23,
at 3.
85 Mortgage Lending, supra note 23, at 2-3; see also Dream Home, supra note 18,
at 33 (reporting that a 1998 MH owner survey indicated a 10.4% average rate for bank
loans, and a 12.3% average rate for dealer loans); R. Kevin Dietrich, Proposed
Manufactured Home Regulations Debated, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Feb. 24, 2002,
at F4 (discussing regulations to address predatory lending practices and onerous interest
rates); Mitchell, supra note 8, at 2 (noting Consumers Union's finding that MH loans
were typically issued to consumers at interest rates of 9-13% A.P.R., or above, at a time
when conventional home loans ranged from 7-8.5%). A Texas study recently found MH
loans ranging from 7.75-19%, at a time when thirty-year conventional home loans were
in the ranges of 7 and 8.5%. Id. at 13.
86 See Mitchell, supra note 8, at 3, 13-16 (noting that, in many of the loans it
reviewed, "the points alone added more than three percent to the net price" and
explaining how points augment the actual interest rate).
87 Id. at 21.
88 Id. (noting report by the Consumer Federation of America/Center for Economic
Justice).
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MH consumers generally may not avoid these high interest rates and
costs by arguing that they are unconscionable. 89 This is true even though
these high rates and costs drive MH loans "underwater," meaning the MH
debt exceeds the value of the MH that secures the debt.90 MH debtors thus
become vulnerable to foreclosure and repossession at rates that have been as
high as 20% over the past seven years. 9 1 A reported 12% of all MH loans end
up in default, which is four times the default rate for conventional
mortgages. 92 In addition, MH lenders often launch dual attacks by
foreclosing on the MHs as collateral, while also suing the debtors personally
for the deficiencies that may remain after sale of the repossessed MHs. 93 To
make matters worse, defective MHs presumably 94draw lower prices in resale,
thereby increasing debtors' deficiency liabilities.
UCC Article 9 fosters this liberal repossession of MHs. It does not
require the rigorous rules that apply to real estate foreclosures. 95 Real estate
law may permit debtors to redeem property at any time prior to resale by
paying off the entire debt, or only the amount in arrears. 96 It also may allow
debtors to redeem property after a foreclosure sale 97 and may protect debtors
98
from post-foreclosure deficiency lawsuits.
89 Mobile Am. Corp. v. Howard, 307 So. 2d 507, 507-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(holding that a MH installment sales contract requiring an annual interest rate of 11.75%
was not per se unconscionable because cost alone will not render an agreement
unconscionable).
90 Mitchell, supra note 8, at 22-25.
91 See Mortgage Lending, supra note 23, at 2 (stating that this rate is much higher
for chattel loans than for conventional mortgages as well); Bailey, supra note 83, at Al
(lamenting the "rash of repossessions" in 2001 and 2002 due to loose lending practices).
92 NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 13 (emphasizing how lenders have used this
risk to justify a "range of permissible loan terms and tactics [that] extends beyond what
would pass muster in the conventional mortgage market"). Financing options are even
more limited with respect to MH refinancing, resale, or renovation, than they are with
respect to new MH purchases. Id. at 27.
93 See Bailey, supra note 83, at Al (noting comparison rates for defaults).
94 It seems, however, that a consumer would have some recourse in a warranty
action for damages suffered because the consumer became liable to a lender for a
deficiency caused by MH defects.
95 See HILL, supra note 77, at 199-289 (outlining the law regarding real estate
mortgage defaults).
96 See id. at 209-13 (discussing judicial foreclosure); see also 1 GRANT S. NELSON &
DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 7.1, 604-05 (4th ed. 2002).
97 NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 96, at 604-O5; Joan M. Cambray, Commercial
Real Estate Financing: What Borrowers and Lenders Need to Know: Default and
Foreclosure,in 2 PRACTISING L. INST. 307, 320-22 (Joshua Stein ed., 2002) (explaining
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In contrast, a secured MH lender may privately repossess a MH,
provided the secured lender does not breach the peace. 99 A lender also may
swiftly foreclose on a MH using state replevin statutes, which are less
protective of debtor rights than real estate foreclosure laws. 10 0 Assuming an
acceleration clause, UCC Article 9 generally requires a debtor to pay off an
entire secured debt to redeem a MH prior to its sale or other disposition, and
does not provide for post-sale redemption or debt reinstatement. 101 UCC
Article 9 also preserves secured parties' rights to seek deficiencies from
debtors. 102
MH lenders may augment their rights by imposing arbitration provisions
in MH contracts. These provisions often allow the lender to proceed directly
in court to repossess and foreclose on a MH, while the MH debtor must
arbitrate any warranty claims. 103 Courts generally enforce arbitration
requirements despite default on a debt and may order parties to arbitrate
breach of contract claims even though the defaulting debtor has filed for
bankruptcy. 10 4 This means defaulting consumers may lose their MHs through
the broad redemption and reinstatement rights provided to real estate debtors under

California law).

98 See HILL, supra note 77, at 267-69 (discussing such protective measures).
99 U.C.C. § 9-609(b) (1998); see also Smith, supra note 81, at 53-58 (describing

basic default-rules of UCC Article 9 as recently revised). Generally, a secured party must
sell repossessed collateral in a private or public sale, apply proceeds to repayment of the
debt and costs of repossession, and then return any surplus from the sale to the debtors.
Id.
100 See U.C.C. § 9-601(0; see also Christopher Barrier, A Stitch in Time: Secured
Lending Under Revised Article 9, ARK. LAW., Fall 2001, at 29, 32-34 (noting pro-lender
aspects of revised UCC Article 9).
101 This assumes these loan agreements have acceleration clauses, as nearly all loans
do. U.C.C. § 9-623; JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE: SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 25 (5th ed. 2000); Smith, supra note 81, at 56.
102 A secured MH lender generally may sell repossessed collateral in a private or
public sale, apply proceeds to repayment of the debt and repossession/resale costs, and
then return any surplus from the sale to the debtors. A secured party also has the option of
retaining collateral in satisfaction of a debt, unless the collateral is consumer goods in the
possession of the debtor, or consumer goods for which a significant portion of its
purchase price has already been paid. U.C.C. §§ 9-620, 9-608(b), 9-616. UCC Article 9's
consumer provisions merely protect a consumer debtor by requiring that the lender
seeking a deficiency provide the consumer with an explanation of the calculation of the
deficiency claim before demanding its payment. U.C.C. § 9-616.
103 See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text (discussing unilateral carve-outs
for lenders' suits).
104 See In re Dunes Hotel Assocs., 194 B.R. 967, 991-94 (Bankr. D.S.C. 1995)
(finding that many of the real estate claims were core claims that must be determined by
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lenders' mass collection practices before the consumers have a chance to
arbitrate warranty claims. 105 These realities recently led Freddie Mac to ban
binding arbitration clauses in all subprime loans it purchases because these
clauses defy "our nation's public policy of an open and fair path to
06
homeownership."'1
2. Uneven BargainingPower in MH Consumer Transactions
a. MH Insiders' Relative Power

MH insiders generally enjoy significantly more economic and political
power than do their constituent consumers. 10 7 This has allowed some insiders
to perpetuate warranty and financing abuses. 10 8 By 1998, a reported ten
companies manufactured almost three-fourths of all MHs. °9 MH insiders
also have enhanced their power by consolidating both financially and
politically. 1 10 Industry leaders have joined political forces through groups
such as the Manufactured Housing Institute (MHI), which represents

the bankruptcy court, but holding that breach of lease and damages due to breach could
go to arbitration per the parties' contract).
105 See Samuel J.M. Donnelly and Mary Ann Donnelly, Commercial Law Is a
Humanism, 53 SYRACUSE L. REv. 277, 297-99 (2003) (discussing how abuses "grow up"
around collection practices, and how mass production of consumer collection practices
are perpetuated through routine default judgments in roughly 90% of collection actions).
106 Consumer, Civil Rights Groups Commend Freddie Mac's Leadership in Banning
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, PR NEWSwlRE ASSOCIATION, INC., Dec. 9, 2003, at
http://www.pmewswire.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2004); see also Freddie Mac Bans
Mandatory Arbitration,COURIER NEws, Dec. 19, 2003, at 7F, availableat LEXIS, News
Library, US Newspapers and Wires File (reporting ban on arbitration clauses); Gregory J.
Wilcox, Freddie Mac's Mortgage Shift Protects Consumers, THE DAILY NEWS OF LOS
ANGELES, Dec. 14, 2003, at BI, available at LEXIS, News Library, US Newspapers and
Wires File (reporting same and noting that Freddie Mac has similar rule for prime loans).
107 See NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 3 (discussing consolidation and
integration of MH manufacturers, dealers, and lenders).
108 See id.
109 Dream Home, supra note 18, at 30; Kortney Stringer, How ManufacturedHousing Sector Built Itself Into a Mess, WALL ST. J.,May 24, 2001, at B4 (discussing
consolidation in the wake of the devastating fall of some MH companies due to easy
credit and unchecked increases in manufacturing).
110 See Dream Home, supra note 18, at 34 (noting the predominance of powerful
MH park owners, including Clayton Homes, one of the largest MH manufacturers).
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manufacturers, retailers, insurers, and financiers."'1 The MHI is a
multimillion-dollar association that maintains a dominant voice in HUD's
establishment of MH manufacturing and safety standards. 112 In addition, a
relatively small pool of lenders who specialize in subprime or MH lending
has maintained considerable influence over MH financing."13
b. High-PressureDeals on Terms Favorableto Industry

Insiders
Some MH insiders use their disproportionate power to impose one-sided
contract terms on MH consumers in high-pressure sales. 114 Dealers may get
consumers approved for financing and prepare sales and financing contracts
in a matter of hours.' 15 Lenders often fail to slow the sales process to ensure
consumers' capacity to repay their loans. 116 Instead, some dealers and
lenders discourage loan shopping by warning consumers against getting

I11 Robert W. Wilden, Manufactured Housing: A Study of Power and Reform in
IndustrialRegulation, 6 HOUSING PoLIcY DEBATE 523, 531 (1995).
112 Id. at 531-36 (discussing the role of MHI in establishing national policies); see
also NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 16 (noting how MHI has promoted MHs as a
means of affordable housing, and touts their cost and efficiency benefits). In 1990, for
example, Congress created the National Commission on Manufactured Housing (NCMH)
that developed an initial plan for a five-year warranty that never came to fruition because
MH retailers and manufacturers joined forces to squelch the plan. ASCE Proposes
Amendment
to
Manufactured
Housing
Bill,
available
at
http://www.asce.org/pressroom/news/grwk/grwk0310_manufacturedhousing.cfm
(Mar.
10, 2000) (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) (explaining the American Society of Civil
Engineers' (ASCE) proposal to quell the MH industry's influence over the creation and
enforcement of federal safety standards by reforming HUD's "consensus committee"
approach).
113 See HUD Subprime and Manufactured Home Lender List, available at
http://www.huduser.org/datasets/manu.html (last visited Aug. 14, 2004) (indicating only
19 MH lenders).
114 Dream Home, supra note 18, at 33 (noting that consumers must generally make
this very significant financial and housing decision based on catalog descriptions and
models).
115 See Tips, supra note 70, at 12.
116 See Mitchell, supra note 8, at 9 (discussing lenders' focus on volume, especially
when affiliated with MH manufacturers and dealers). Even independent lenders have
been emphasizing sales volume, and therefore have been lending to consumers who have
credit scores that suggest they would not be able to repay the loan. Id.; see also Mortgage
Lending, supra note 23, at 3 (noting with respect to financing that it is "difficult for
buyers to choose the slower path, using a more conservatively underwritten mortgage
loan").
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credit checks at multiple dealerships.' 17 Dealers also may dissuade
comparative shopping by charging fairly hefty, and sometimes
nonrefundable, deposits in order to reserve a MH or begin the credit
application process. 118
MH dealers also may turn up sales pressure by promoting package sales
that cover the MH, insurance, and financing. These packages can also
include MH park rent, furniture, appliances, and so-called "freebies" (e.g.,
cars, vacations, cell phones, and coupon books). 1 9 Some dealers, however,
clandestinely add these costs to loan amounts, 120 or otherwise misrepresent

12 1
total package costs.
This is especially problematic when consumers hastily sign purchase
agreements without reading the immediate agreements, let alone any package
terms incorporated into an agreement by reference.' 22 Insiders also may
impose onerous warranty and financing terms on MH consumers in standard
form contracts. 123 Courts enforce such boilerplate agreements, subject to
general contract defenses, such as fraud, unconscionability, and lack of
consideration. 124 Consumers may unknowingly agree to package costs that
125
poise them for default by raising loan amounts well above MH values.

117 See Mitchell, supra note 8, at 4 (discussing dealership training that includes
telling consumers that shopping around will harm their credit).
118 Id. at 4, 6-7. Deposits range from $100 to $500, and some dealers also charge a
credit check fee of $25 or more. Id. at 4. Consumers Union found that 19% of the MH
complaints it reviewed involved dealers who refused to return deposit money after a
consumer decided not to complete the purchase. Id. at 1-2, 6.
119 Id. at 6. These so-called gifts are offered to get consumers to close the deal,
without really considering all the terms and conditions of a MH purchase. Id.
120 Id.

121 Id. at 1-3. In the Consumers Union's review of over 400 complaints filed with
the Attorney General and the Office of Consumer Credit Commissioner (OCCC), It
found that the principal complaints focused on "too-good-to-be-true offers." Id. at 1. The
laundry list of alleged dealer misrepresentations included complaints that the dealer
switched the house, tried to falsify loan application information, increased the price of the
MH, included additional fees and costs not disclosed at the start, or asked consumers to
sign blank documents. Id.
122 Tips, supra note 70, at 11.
123 See Paper Tiger, supra note 65, at 7 (discussing boilerplate agreements used
throughout the MH industry by insider retailers, manufacturers and lenders).
124
john J.A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 307-10 (2000) (critiquing the current regulation of standard form
contracts, and proposing that the law account for the reality that a form contract is "a
series of terms embedded by a seller in products marketed for mass distribution and
consumption"); see also Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Nalley, 777 So. 2d 99, 102-03
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c. Absence of Education or Counsel Regarding MH
Transactions
The classes, counselors, and educational programs available to assist
those considering purchasing conventional site-built homes are usually not
available for MH consumers. 126 This lack of MH buyer education and
counseling resources is particularly problematic for first-time homebuyers
and low-income consumers likely to purchase MHs. 127 MH purchasers also
typically do not enjoy the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) three-day cooling-off
period during which conventional homebuyers can cancel a real estate
28

loan. 1

It seems that lenders should fill this education gap in order to protect
their investments in consumer MH purchases. Studies indicate, however, that
most lenders do not provide important information to MH consumers about
their rights. 129 One prominent MH lender was subject to a $27 million
judgment for its failure to inform consumers regarding their rights to choose

(Ala. 2000) (compelling arbitration of MH warranty claims and holding that the
Magnuson Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (MMWA) does
not bar the enforcement of an arbitration clause in a written warranty) Mobile Am. Corp.
v. Howard, 307 So. 2d 507, 507-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (per curiam) (reversing a
trial court finding that a MH installment sales contract requiring an 11.75% interest rate
was "so unconscionable as to shock this court's conscience," thereby allowing for the
contract's enforcement on remand). But see First Nat'l Bank of Md. v. DiDomenico, 487
A.2d 646, 648-50 (Md. 1985) (finding that a lender's misstatement of a MH debtor's
rights in the notice of repossession and resale of the MH as collateral for the loan violated
the UCC, and therefore the lender could not seek a deficiency judgment where proceeds
of the MH sale did not cover the outstanding debt).
125 See Tips, supra note 70, at 9 (noting that this is especially true with property
insurance in that it would be cheaper if purchased directly from an insurance company);
see also MH Appreciation, supra note 18, at 3-4 (explaining how onerous financing and
added costs cause loans to be underwater).
126 See Raising the Floor, supra note 18, at 1 (advocating that homeownership
classes should provide information regarding MH purchasing); NRC EXAMINATION,
supra note 1, at 18-19, 21, 24-25 (noting lack of MH buyer education).
127 See NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 19 (noting how it is "incongruous" that
those most in need of homebuyer education do not have access to such information
regarding MH purchasing).
12 8 Id. at 18 (noting how the TILA three-day period during which real estate debtors
can terminate a home loan does not apply for personal property loans).
129 See id. at 18-19 (lamenting the "enormous need for homebuyer education and
counseling").
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their own brokers or attorneys. 130 Some consumer groups also argue that the
lack of education and counseling makes MH consumers particularly
13
vulnerable to pro-industry promotional materials. 1
IlI. CREATION OF THE ARBITRAL REGIME THREATENING CONSUMERS'

MH WARRANTY CLAIMS
Binding arbitration clauses in MH contracts augment burdens of MH
living. MH consumers' challenges to these clauses have even hit the
Supreme Court. 132 This is not surprising, because MH insiders routinely
include binding arbitration provisions in their form sales and financing
contracts. 133 Furthermore, consumers almost never have the opportunity to
negotiate these provisions, even though they may severely curtail consumers'
remedial and procedural rights. 134 Most courts nonetheless enforce these
arbitration clauses pursuant to the Supreme Court's pro-arbitration
application of the FAA. 135 Arbitration, therefore, has become a norm for MH
130 Bailey, supra note 83, at Al. Lenders such as Green Tree Financial Corp. have
also been reported to use "gain on sale" accounting, which allowed them "to approve as
many mortgages as possible, regardless of the ability of client to repay, knowing the
loans would still show up as profit." Id. It was reported that this drove up Green Tree's
stock and provided its CEO with $200 million in salary. Id. Still, some lenders have met
to develop standard practices aimed to improve quality control and consumer protection.
Id.
131 See NRC EXAMINATION, supra note 1, at 18-19 (noting the need for homebuyer
education).
132 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 446-47, 450-52 (2003); Green
Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (addressing the costs of arbitration
of TILA claims under a mobile home financing agreement).
133 See Melissa Briggs Hutchens, At What Costs?: When Consumers Cannot Afford
the Costs of Arbitration in Alabama, 53 ALA. L. REV. 599, 600 (2002) ("It is almost
impossible to purchase a new car or mobile home or to get a small loan without being
subject to a form contract containing an arbitration provision.").
134 See Terry Carter, Arbitration Pendulum: Mandatory Arbitration Agreements,
Once an Easy Pass, Come Under More Scrutiny, A.B.A. J., May 2003, at 14 (discussing
abuse by some companies that impose arbitration clauses in consumer contracts). See
generally David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee
and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 33
(1997) (questioning arbitration of employee and consumer claims pursuant to form
agreements).
135 See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 9 U.S.C. (2000)); UNIF. ARBITRATION AcT, 7 U.L.A. 1
(1997). Discussion regarding enforcement under the FAA equally implicates enforcement
under the UAA because the UAA mimics the FAA. See also Randolph, 531 U.S. at 84-

OHIO STATE JOURNAL ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 20:2 20051

consumer claims. This, in turn, has allowed MH insiders to create an
36
effectual private lawmaking regime. 1
A. Insider-ImposedArbitrationProvisions
"Virtually all manufactured homes are sold with arbitration
agreements."' 137 Indeed, arbitration clauses are more prevalent in MH
contracts than in conventional home contracts. 138 These arbitration clauses
preclude consumers' access to a jury and the judicial process by requiring
them to submit disputes to a private arbitrator who renders a binding decision
subject to very limited judicial review.1 39 Under the FAA, courts must
enforce these clauses by compelling arbitration and/or staying litigation
unless the clause is unenforceable under general contract law. 140 Many courts
eagerly uphold these clauses due to what many have seen as the Supreme

90 (finding MH consumer failed to meet burden of proving prohibitive arbitration costs
and therefore enforced arbitration provision in financing contract); Allied-Bruce
Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 268 (1995) (enforcing arbitration clause in
consumer "Termite Protection Plan").
136 See David V. Snyder, Private Lawmaking, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 371, 375-77, 40203, 410-12, 448-49 (2003) (explaining private law and private lawmaking, and
proposing that it should be subject to scrutiny due to the significant amount of private
lawmaking that predicts how courts will act in commercial disputes).
137 Paper Tiger, supra note 65, at 7; see also Carter, supra note 134, at 14
(emphasizing the prevalence of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts in Alabama,
especially in response to large consumer verdicts in the 1990s).
138 Tips, supra note 70, at 9 (noting that the Texas state association of MH retailers
distributes a standard form contract that contains an arbitration clause).
139 Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 9 U.S.C.); Burke, supra note 124, at 285, 315-16 (discussing the
strict enforcement of arbitration agreements in form contracts, and their preclusion of
judicial access). Arbitrators' awards are subject to very limited review under the FAA
and UAA. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000); UNIF. ARBITRATION ACT § 12; REVISED UNIF.
ARBITRATION ACT § 23(a)(1-6).
140 If a valid arbitration agreement exists the court must order the parties to arbitrate
and any issues going to the validity of the underlying contract are for the arbitrators to
decide. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967)
(announcing the "separability doctrine," which deems the arbitration clause separable
from the main contract, thereby requiring that a court compel arbitration of underlying
issues once it determines there is an arbitration agreement). Furthermore, if the parties do
not empanel an arbitrator, the court will do so to get arbitration underway. 9 U.S.C. § 5;
see also Burke, supra note 124, at 315-16 ("Strangely, the arbitration clause is the term
least likely to be judicially invalidated," due to policy favoring enforcement.).
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Court's federalization of its pro-enforcement agenda. 14 t Some criticize this
agenda, however, and question arbitration's fairness in uneven bargaining
contexts. 142
Arbitration may be beneficial in the MH sales and financing context. It
seems courts should enforce consumers' consensual agreements to arbitrate
where arbitration procedures are fair and result in cost savings that insiders
ultimately pass on to consumers. 14 3 The problem is that MH insiders with
disproportionate bargaining power over consumers often contractually

141 See Julia A. Scarpino, Mandatory Arbitrationof Consumer Disputes: A Proposal
to Ease the FinancialBurden on Low-Income Consumers, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL'Y & L. 679, 683-91 (critiquing the Supreme Court's "pro-arbitration stance" in
consumer disputes); Hutchens, supra note 133, at 600-05 (discussing the Supreme
Court's application of the FAA's preemptive force to enforce arbitration in consumer
contracts).
142 See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 11, at 264-71 (noting the potential benefits of
arbitration); Ware, supra note 11, at 708-09 (describing flexibility and private choice in
arbitration). But see generally Jean R. Stemlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Court's Preferencefor Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q.
637 (1996) (critiquing companies' inclusion of arbitration clauses in their contracts with
consumers, employees, and other "little guys"); see also Paper Tiger, supra note 70, at 7,
21-22, 29 (discussing MH retailers' and lenders' imposition of arbitration on consumers);
Thomas J. Stipanowich, Resolving Consumer Disputes: Due Process Protocol Protects
Consumer Rights, DISP. RESOL. J., Aug. 1998, at 8, 9-11 (noting "'privatization' of
adjudication in consumer contracts" through the vast expansion of arbitration in the wake
of "favorable Supreme Court decisions affirming the broad reach of federal arbitration
law"); Consumers Union, The Arbitration Trap: How Consumers Pay for 'Low Cost'
Justice,
CONSUMER
REP.
(Aug.
1999),
available
at
http://www.consumerreports.org/main/detail.jsp?CONTENT%3C%3Ecntid= 19279&FO
LDER%3C%3Efolderid=l8151 [hereinafter Arbitration Trap] (noting that arbitration
has the potential to alleviate delays of litigation, but lamenting unfairness of procedures
and costs imposed on MH consumers).
143 See Andrew P. Lamis, The New Age of Artificial Legal Reasoning as Reflected in
the Judicial Treatment of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Federal Arbitration Act, 15
LoY. CONSUMER L. REv. 173, 246-47 (2003) (promoting fair and voluntary alternative
redress mechanisms for the resolution of consumer claims); see also Stephen J. Ware,
Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law (With a ContractualistReply to
Carrington & Haagen), 29 McGEORGE L. REv. 195, 211-13 (1998) (discussing the cost
savings of arbitration in consumer transactions). The question is whether insiders share
these savings with consumers or hoard them. See Sternlight, supra note 142, at 686-93
(critiquing free market justifications for arbitration of consumer claims, and concluding
that, "given the high cost of information and consumers' behavior with respect to risk, it
appears that failing to regulate the market with respect to arbitration clauses is likely to
lead to an inefficient result that benefits those who impose form arbitration agreements").
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mandate particularly pro-industry arbitration terms and procedures.144 Effects
of onerous arbitration procedures, combined with the economic, social, and
political complexities of MH transactions, threaten the potential that MHs
provide for low-income consumers to own their homes. One-sided arbitration
requirements may leave MH consumers with severely limited means for
policing the safety of their homes. These requirements may prevent MH
consumers from vindicating their warranty rights prior to losing their homes
45
in foreclosure. 1
Typical arbitration clauses in MH sales and financing contracts broadly
require that consumers arbitrate any and all MH claims, including contract,
warranty, tort, and statutory claims. 14 6 These broad clauses also may inure to
the benefit of third parties and assignees of the agreement, such as
manufacturers and lenders. 147 In addition, MH insiders often impose
arbitration provisions that hit consumers from every angle by including a full
arsenal of anti-consumer provisions.' 4 8 These provisions often allow insiders
to select the arbitrator and seek judicial relief for nonpayment and
144 Scarpino, supra note 141, at 685-91 (discussing the onerous costs and
procedures of consumer arbitration provisions).
145 See supra Part H (discussing the confluence of unique factors affecting MH
transactions).
146 See, e.g., Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 613
n. 1 (1 th Cir. 2001) (quoting a broad arbitration clause in a MH sales contract, covering
all claims "arising out of or in any way relating" to sale of MH and negotiations leading
to sale, including contract, warranty, and tort, and expressly inuring to the benefit of
third-party manufacturers, etc.).
147 See id.; see also Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A
Case Study of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 583, 610-13 (2002)
(discussing the "frequent fact pattern" in Alabama cases in which MH consumers are
bound to arbitrate claims against third parties by an arbitration agreement under thirdparty beneficiary rules; further finding that the issue of whether a consumer was bound to
arbitrate with a non-signatory defendant split the Alabama Supreme Court 11 times
between January 18, 1995, and July 9, 1999, and that "business-funded justices" cast
67% of their votes in these cases to require arbitration, while "plaintiffs'-lawyer-funded
justices" cast zero votes for a broad interpretation).
148 See Stemlight, supra note 142, at 686-93 (proposing that consumers are unlikely
to find, let alone fully comprehend and negotiate, arbitration provisions in form
contracts); Mark E. Budnitz, Arbitration of Disputes Between Consumers and Financial
Institutions: A Serious Threat to Consumer Protection, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL.
267, 320-22 (1995) (opining that any "option" consumers may have for taking their
business to lenders who do not require arbitration is illusory in that consumers are
unlikely to be fully informed about pros and cons of arbitration, and they may not have
alternatives due to increasing prevalence of arbitration clauses and limited borrowing
opportunities for rural and low-income consumers).
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foreclosure, while consumers must arbitrate any tort, warranty, and contract
claims.
In addition, standard clauses often do not provide for neutral
administration by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) or another
organization that may require application of consumer protection procedures.
For example, the typical arbitration clause in Conseco's (formerly Green
Tree Financial Corp.) MH sale and financing form contract provides that all
disputes of any kind must be determined by one arbitrator "selected by
[Conseco] with [the MH consumer's] consent." 14 9 It also reserves to Conseco
the "option to use judicial (filing a lawsuit) or non-judicial relief to enforce a
security agreement relating to the [MH] secured in a transaction underlying
this arbitration agreement, to enforce the monetary obligation secured by the
[MH] or to foreclose on the [MH]." The clause further states that Conseco's
exercise of that option does not waive its right to enforce a consumer's duty
to arbitrate.' 50 This means a consumer may not assert warranty and other
claims as counterclaims to any judicial foreclosure action Conseco asserts
against the consumer.
These unilateral carve-outs for collection and foreclosure actions allow
lenders to quickly repossess MHs and collect on delinquent loans.' 5 1 This
may seem fair in light of the high risks of MH loans. These carve-outs favor
insiders, however, even when they allow either party to seek ancillary relief,
because consumers rarely, if ever, use them.' 52 Generally, consumers' chief
claims are warranty, contract, or statutory claims, which the arbitration
provisions cover. Furthermore, these carve-outs impact consumers' warranty
rights by stripping any leverage a consumer may have for coaxing insiders to
remedy defects. MH consumers often try to obtain repairs by withholding
payment on a MH loan or purchase until a responsible party cures the
defects. Carve-outs, however, allow insiders to repossess the MH from a

149 See Crayton v. Conseco Fin. Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d, 1322, 1324 (M.D. Ala.
2002) (quoting Conseco's form agreement).
150 Id. at 1329 n.5.
151 See, e.g., In re Firstmerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 753-57 (Tex. 2001)
(enforcing an arbitration agreement with a carve-out provision allowing bank to assert
collection and foreclosure claims directly in court); see also Crayton v. Conseco Fin.
Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1323-24 (M.D. Ala. 2002) (enforcing arbitration clause
with same carve-out provision).
152 See Budnitz, supra note 148, at 274 (discussing carve-out provisions in

consumer loan contracts).
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consumer seeking this strategy before the consumer may get a chance to
15 3
arbitrate warranty claims.
These arbitration provisions also may require that consumers share the
costs of arbitration. This may burden consumers with typically high filing,
administration, and arbitrator fees, and preclude their rights to collect
attorneys' fees under applicable statutes. 154 Arbitration filing costs often
exceed $1,000, and parties may have to advance their share of the arbitrator's
155
fees, which can range up to $1,600 per day for one arbitrator.
Consumers often challenge these cost-sharing provisions because they
stymie consumers' vindication of warranty and other statutory rights. These
153 See, e.g., In re FirstmeritBank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d at 753-56 (ordering consumers
to arbitrate warranty and credit claims, even though the bank, had already repossessed
their MH pursuant to the carve-out provision); see also Tammac Corp. v. Norch, No.
2002CA00402, 2003 WL 21224229, at *2-4 (Ohio Ct. App. May 27, 2003) (denying
class relief to mortgagors in foreclosure action, and emphasizing concern that mortgagors
will counterclaim for class relief to avoid quick foreclosure).
154 See Scarpino, supra note 141, at 688-90 (discussing the high costs and fees
associated with arbitration); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82-90
(2000) (addressing, but providing little guidance, about how to proceed when arbitration
costs are so high that they preclude a consumer from vindicating statutory rights).
155 See AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES,

R-49-R-52 (2003), at http://www.adr.org/RulesProcedures (last visited Oct. 18, 2004)
(requiring that parties making claims or counterclaims must advance filing fees subject to
final apportionment by the arbitrator, that parties bear other arbitration expenses and
arbitrators' fees, and that parties may have to deposit sums necessary to cover costs in
advance of hearings); see also id. at 0-8 (listing filing and case service fees according to
amount of claim as follows: $0-$10,000 = $700; $10,001-$75,000 = $1,050; $75,001$150,000 = $2,250; $150,001-$300,000 = $4,000; etc., up to fees of $14,000 for
$5,000,000-$10,000,000 claims); Scarpino, supra note 141, at 688-91 (contrasting $750
arbitration filing fee for smaller claims with $150 fee for filing a complaint in federal
court). Parties to arbitration are also responsible for arbitrators' fees, rental room costs,
transcriber fees and costs, etc., all of which add up to thousands of dollars. Id.
Nonetheless, the AAA and others have suggested summary and expedited procedures for
consumer disputes that should apply when the AAA is used to administer arbitrations
pursuant to businesses' "standardized, systematic application of arbitration clauses with
customers and where the terms and conditions of the purchase of standardized,
consumable goods or services are non-negotiable or primarily non-negotiable in most or
all of its terms, conditions, features, or choices" where the products or services are for
personal or household use. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SUPPLEMENTARY
PROCEDURES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF CONSUMER-RELATED

DISPUTES (2003),

at

http://www.adr.org/RulesProcedures (last visited Oct. 18, 2004) [hereinafter AAA
CONSUMER RULES]. When these consumer procedures apply, the AAA specifies
administrative and arbitrator fees that vary depending on the amount of claims and extent
of any hearings, and cap fees consumers must pay. Id.
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challenges remain viable in the wake of the Supreme Court's failure to
articulate standards for these provisions in Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph.15 6 The Court in Randolph indicated that parties may be able to
avoid arbitration based on a sufficient showing that they would bear
prohibitively high arbitration costs. 157 The Court did not explain, however,
what showing would be sufficient. 15 8 Instead, it upheld the MH arbitration
agreement at issue because it was ambiguous regarding the consumers'
responsibility for allegedly high costs. 15 9
In reality, it is often difficult for MH consumers to bear arbitration
costs. 160 This is especially true when these consumers have fairly small
claims, but may not assert them in a class action due to arbitration
provisions.1 6 1 Arbitration provisions prevent claimants from joining judicial
class actions, and most courts refuse to order class-wide arbitration unless the
parties' contracts clearly allow it. 162 Many courts also refuse to consolidate
related arbitrations where separate arbitration agreements do not expressly
provide for consolidation. 163

156 Randolph, 531 U.S. at 82-90.
157 Id.
1581Id.
159 The Court found that, although Randolph had provided information regarding
high AAA arbitration fees and costs, she had not presented a sufficient record indicating
that she would bear those costs and that they would preclude her from vindicating her
contract and statutory rights. Id. at 91 (stating that the contract's silence regarding costs
was "plainly insufficient to render it unenforceable").
160 See, e.g., id. at 83 (noting that the district court (991 F. Supp. 1410 (M.D. Ala.
1997)) had denied Randolph's request for class certification, although her TILA claim
involved many credit consumers with similar low-dollar claims, and therefore it seemed
economically infeasible for individuals to each launch separate claims); see also Jean R.
Sternlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class
Action Survive?, 42 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1, 5-21 (2000) (discussing how consumers'
inability to assert class actions due to arbitration provisions often prevents consumers
from asserting their claims).
161 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 217-24 (1985) (holding
that the court lacks discretion to try arbitrable and nonarbitral claims in one lawsuit
because the court must order arbitration of arbitrable claims under the FAA).
162 See, e.g., Iowa Grain Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999) (refusing
to order class arbitration); Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274-77 (7th Cir.
1995) (same); Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Disc. Co., 828 F. Supp. 673, 674 (D. Minn.
1993) (same).
163 See, e.g., Gov't of the United Kingdom v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir.
1993); Del E. Webb. Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir.
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The propriety of ordering class-wide arbitration remains uncertain. The
Supreme Court, in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, declined to answer
whether the FAA permits class-wide arbitration when the arbitration
agreement is silent on the issue. 164 Instead, the Court, in a 5-4 decision,
vacated a South Carolina court's order for class relief on the grounds that it
was for the arbitrator, and not the court, to determine Whether the arbitration
clause at issue prohibited class-wide arbitration. 165
Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle is particularly poignant for MH
claimants. It involved class arbitrations in two companion cases against
Green Tree Financial Corporation (Bazzle and Lackey) regarding its failure to
provide notice to MH and subprime borrowers concerning their rights to
choose their own attorneys and insurance agents. 166 In the Bazzle case, an
arbitrator awarded a class of 1,899 consumers $10,935,000 in damages, and
an additional $3,645,500 in attorney's fees and $18,242 in costs. 167 These
class members may have foregone asserting their claims, however, if forced
to do so in individual arbitrations, because each member obtained an average
award of only $5,760.168 Similarly, in Lackey, individual MH consumers
1987); Baesler v. Cont'l Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193, 1195 (8th Cir. 1990) (all refusing to
order consolidated arbitration).
164 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
165 Id. at 447-58. The decision was 5-4 and there was no majority opinion. Id. See
also PacifiCare Health Sys. Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003) (holding in an 8-0 ruling
that it was for arbitrators, and not the court, to determine whether arbitration agreements
in health care contracts barred treble damages for RICO claims by prohibiting "punitive"
damages); Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79 (2002) (holding that an
arbitrator, and not a court, must determine whether a securities dispute is barred by the
six-year time limit in the NASD's arbitration procedures). These cues from the Court
have prompted lower courts to similarly avoid questions regarding what arbitration
procedures are required under parties' contracts. See Pedcor Mgmt. Co., Inc. v. Nations
Personnel of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that the arbitrator must
determine whether an agreement permits class arbitration).
166 Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447-49 (noting that both proceedings involved consumers'
class arbitrations against Green Tree Financial Corp. arising out of lending agreements
that contained identical arbitration provisions); see also Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.,
569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002) (explaining claims involved in the case).
167 Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d at 352-53 (indicating claims under S.C. Code
Ann. § 37-10-105 (Supp. 1996 & 1997) and noting $10,935,000 award for 1,899
claimants, thereby indicating an average $5,760 per class member).
168 Id. Economic rationale indicates that consumers are likely to assert their claims if
their expected award in an arbitration exceeds their dispute resolution costs, and are
likely to forebear if their forbearance costs are less than their marginal expected liability.
See also Christopher R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, Economics of Litigation and
Arbitration: An Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. OF LEGAL STuDIES 549, 552
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asserted fairly small dollar claims, but the arbitrator awarded the class $9.2
million in statutory damages, as well as attorneys' fees. 169 Nonetheless, the
Supreme Court sent the cases back to the arbitrators to determine whether the
arbitration provisions allowed class-wide arbitration. 170 If the provisions did
not allow class relief, then the awards were voided, and the consumers had
the burden to reassert their claims in individual arbitrations.
Form arbitration provisions in MH contracts also are problematic
17 1
because insiders often bury the provisions in take-it-or-leave-it deals.
Indeed, MH consumers in the midst of a high pressure MH purchase are

(2003). Under this analysis, it seems that consumers are unlikely to bear high arbitration
costs to assert low dollar claims on an individual basis, but would be more likely to assert
their claims if they are able to share dispute resolution costs through class relief.
169 The South Carolina Court of Appeals had determined that the arbitration
agreement was contained in a contract of adhesion, but it was not unconscionable, despite
its seemingly anti-consumer terms. Lackey v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 330 S.C. 388, 394402 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998); see also Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459. Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, dissented on the grounds that a court must
determine if a contract allows for class arbitration, and that the contracts at issue barred
class-wide arbitration by stating that each Green Tree customer must agree to "a
particular arbitrator for disputes between [Green Tree] and that specific buyer." Id. at
455-59. Justice Thomas dissented to reiterate his view that the FAA does not apply in
state court proceedings, and therefore should have no impact on the South Carolina
court's judgment. Id. at 460.
170 Id. at 453-55 (vacating the South Carolina court's determination that the contract
allowed for class arbitration). The arbitrator's award, including its determination of
whether the contract allows for class arbitration, will be subject to FAA § 10 limited
review. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2003).
171 "Take-it-or-leave-it" arbitration provisions included in form agreements raise
important concerns regarding the consensual nature of arbitration. See Sternlight, supra
note 142, at 686-93 (arguing that suppliers generally are free to impose arbitration
clauses that take advantage of consumers because consumers are unlikely to be informed
about the existence or meaning of arbitration provisions); see generally IAN R. MACNEIL,
AMERICAN

ARBITRATION

LAW:

REFORMATION,

NATIONALIZATION,

INTERNATIONALIZATION 68-71 (1992) (discussing concerns regarding one-sided
arbitration agreements at common law); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: "One
Size Fits All" Does Not Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 759 (2001) (proposing that
employees likely do not expend limited resources reading, understanding or negotiating
arbitration clauses); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting In or Opting Out: The New Legal
Process or Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087 (1999) (discussing the unfairness of
arbitration in traditionally non-merchant contexts). But see Stephen J. Ware, Paying the
Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of Consumer ArbitrationAgreements, 2001 J. DISP.
RESOL. 89, 89-93 (2001) (emphasizing cost savings and other arguably pro-consumer
aspects of arbitration that are often overlooked).
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unlikely to notice, let alone challenge, an arbitration clause.1 72 Furthermore,
mass-production of pro-insider provisions seems to standardize fundamental
inequities in MH transactions.' 73 This, in turn, influences what policymakers
and courts accept as valid contractual practices.' 74 Mass acceptance of
insider-friendly arbitration provisions in MH contracts also provides MH
insiders with arguable "repeat-player" advantages, deemed to flow from
arbitrators' incentives to render pro-insider awards in the hopes of earning
future business. 175 As pro-insider provisions become standard, MH
consumers may risk losing their warranty rights, along with their homes.
B. Insiders' Creationof PrivateLaw Through Arbitration
MH insiders' standardization of arbitration rules produces private law
within western liberalism's conceptualization of the public/private legal
divide. 176 This is because arbitration allows insiders to privately govern their
relations and transactions. 177 Legislatures and other governmental bodies
172 See Cole, supra note 2, at 481 (noting how employees do not expend limited
bargaining resources challenging arbitration provisions).
173 See Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC'y REv.
91, 97-101 (2003) (exploring contracts as artifacts that provide insight regarding contract
regimes created within multi-actor economic communities, and noting how standard-form
contracts mimic mass production of conventional artifacts in industrialized societies).
174 Id.at 92-95. Professor Suchman proposes the sociological study of contracts,
which are capable of affecting economic and cultural environments. Id. at 91-93. He
explains that "a consideration of contracts as artifacts links the sociology of contract both
to the sociology of technological systems and to the sociology of cultural discourses." Id.
at 93.
175 See Schwartz, supra note 134, at 60-61 (discussing a study indicating that
corporate defendants enjoy repeat-player advantages in arbitration because arbitrators
have economic incentive to build "track records" that "corporate repeat-users will view
approvingly," thereby sparking referrals and future arbitration business); Cole, supra note
2, at 453 (discussing repeat-player advantages); Budnitz, supra note 148, at 321-22
(noting in consumer lending context that lenders are "repeat players" that are unlikely to
suffer due to occasional arbitrator error, unlike a "one-shot" player/consumer for whom
the results of an erroneous award "may be very grave").
176 Amr A. Shalakany, Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing
Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 419, 452-54 (2000)
(discussing the law as divided into two spheres: public law and private law); see also
Russell
Korobkin,
Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and
Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1203, 1204 (2003) (noting how standard form
contracting allows the drafting party "to create its own private law").
177 See Shalakany, supra note 176, at 452-54 (explaining the distinction between
public and private law).
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engage civic processes to create public law that regulates the conduct of
society as a whole.' 78 The state controls public lawmaking to ensure the
promotion of societal interests. Individuals control their private agreements
to foster their own needs and goals. 179 It follows that constitutional due
process applies to legislative and judicial procedures, but not to arbitration
procedures. 180 Through arbitration agreements, parties can craft private legal
regimes as they please, bound only by contract defenses and scant public
limits.
Contractual liberty generally supports this treatment of private
rulemaking. Complex concerns arise, however, when "private groups are
exercising important segments of lawmaking power, affecting millions who
are not group members."' 81 Industry groups do this when they privately
legislate by promulgating uniform standards and mass-produced contract
terms. 18 2 The MHI, for example, has garnered significant control over MH
183
In
quality by establishing its own standards and feeding them to HUD.
by
imposing
rules
transactional
legislate
addition, MH insiders effectively
contract terms on consumers whose consent to such terms is generally
illusory. 184 This allows MH insiders to impose housing rules that harm not
178 See id.; see also Dinesh D. Banani, International Arbitration and Project
Finance in Developing Countries: Blurring the Public/PrivateDistinction, 26 B.C. INT'L
& COMP. L. REV. 355, 368 (2003) (noting distinctions between public and private law).
179 See Banani, supra note 178, at 368 (discussing the consensual nature of private
lawmaking, as opposed to civic core of public law).
180 See Smith v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 233 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir. 2000)
(holding that commercial arbitration is not state action to which constitutional due
process applies); Cremin v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 957 F. Supp.
1460, 1465-66 (1997) (same). But see Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward a
State Action Theory of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 621-25
(1997) (proposing arbitration constitutes state action when it is judicially enforced).
181 See Snyder, supra note 136, at 375-77. Professor Snyder explains how private
law, or rules governing relations among people, is distinguishable from privately-made
law, in that the latter affects masses of people and predicts how courts will act. Id.at
375-77.
182 Id.

183 See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (discussing MHI and the
dominance of powerful insiders in the MH industry).
184 See Celeste M. Hammond, The (Pre) (As)summed "Consent" of Commercial
Binding Arbitration Contracts: An Empirical Study of Attitudes and Expectations of
Transactional Lawyers, 36 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 589, 604-09 (2003) (discussing the
"'myth' of voluntariness" of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment and
consumer contracts); see also supra Part II.B.2 (discussing how MH insiders impose
terms on consumers with little bargaining power).
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only MH consumers, but also public policies promoting safe and affordable
housing. 185 It accordingly seems that public regulation of this power in the
low-income housing market may be appropriate.186
This is particularly true when MH insiders intensify their power and
bypass nearly all public scrutiny through their arbitration programs.' 87
Although arbitration may promote cooperation among those that share
communal rules and norms, that often is untrue for MH consumers who lack
the information and bargaining power of insiders. In addition, MH insiders
may use arbitration to keep warranty and other contractual breaches private,
and to curtail statutory and other remedies available to consumers.1 88 MH
insiders also are likely to choose arbitrators sympathetic to warranty
defendants, and to enjoy repeat-player advantages. 189
Again, not all MH arbitration provisions are unfair. Optimally,
arbitration would foster efficiencies that would result in lower MH prices and
interest rates, but would not jeopardize MH quality and warranty rights. In
this way, private lawmaking through arbitration can be beneficial to both
insiders and consumers.1 90 Indeed, paternalistic preclusion of MH arbitration
may not be wise. 19 1 However, it seems that some public regulation of MH
185 See Hammond, supra note 184, at 604-09; see also Part H.A.1 (discussing the
low-income housing potential of MHs).
186 See Snyder, supra note 136, at 448-49 (explaining how a significant amount of
law is privately made, and therefore it should be subject to the scrutiny applied to other
law).
187 Contracting communities have used arbitration as an effective tool in cultivating
private law that efficiently regulates their intra-relations. For example, cotton merchants
have relied on tribunals' application of private rules and norms to promote cooperation
and commercial stability and efficiency. Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH.
L. REv. 1724, 1724-45, 1755-56 (2001) (discussing the cotton merchant community's
creation of a private legal system (PLS) through which the community has succeeded in
minimizing transaction, legal system, and collection costs); see also Snyder, supra note
136, at 402-03 (discussing Professor Bernstein's findings regarding the diamond
industry's self-regulation through arbitration).
188 See supra Part III.A (discussing onerous and one-sided arbitration provisions);
see also Crayton v. Conseco Fin. Corp., 237 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1323-24 (M.D. Ala.
2002) (quoting a typical MH arbitration provision, which preserves the lender's power to
select the arbitrator with the consumer's consent).
189 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 142 (citing commentary regarding repeat-player
advantages of arbitration in consumer, employment, and other "little guy" contexts).
190 See infra Part IV (discussing efficiency benefits of arbitration).
191 See Blake D. Morant, The Quest for Bargains in an Age of Contractual
Formalism: Strategic Initiativesfor Small Businesses, 7 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L.

324

MOBILE-HOME MANIA

insiders' private lawmaking may be appropriate to protect consumers with
192
respect to a basic need-safe and adequate shelter.
IV. UNCERTAIN AND INEFFICIENT CHALLENGES OF MH ARBITRATION

PROVISIONS
Regardless of fairness issues, efficiency concerns also justify
clarification of permissible arbitration procedures. MH consumers' continual
and uncertain challenges of arbitration clauses sap efficiency benefits of
arbitration programs. Consumers generally base these challenges on grounds
that arbitration clauses violate the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act (MMWA), or are unenforceable under
contract defenses including unconscionability, lack of consideration, and
fraud. 19 3 Such challenges have had mixed success, which has dwindled as the
Supreme Court strengthens its pro-enforcement mantra. 194 Meanwhile,
consumers generally cannot cling to state regulation of arbitration
agreements, because the Court has held that the FAA applies to all contracts
affecting interstate commerce. This means the FAA applies in both state and
federal court, and preempts state law that treats arbitration agreements

233, 261-67 (2003) (warning of paternalistic intervention that perpetuates arrogant
assumptions regarding parties' ability to determine their contracting needs and
inefficiencies caused by such intervention, but proposing that intervention is necessary
when bargaining inequities result in opportunistic adhesion contracts).
192 See supra Part II.A and accompanying text (discussing the importance of MHs in
the affordable housing market).
193 See, e.g., Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470 (5th Cir. 2002)
(MH consumers challenging arbitration under MMWA); Johnnie's Homes, Inc. v. Holt,
790 So. 2d 956, 963-64 (Ala. 2001) (MH consumers challenging arbitration on
unconscionability grounds). Alabama courts' struggle with MH arbitration alone
exemplifies dissention regarding MH arbitration and the broader debates about
arbitration's over-use in consumer contexts. See Hutchens, supra note 133, at 599-610
(noting political battles regarding consumer arbitration in Alabama and courts' varied
decisions regarding enforcement of cost allocation provisions in consumer arbitration
agreements).
194 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) (holding that the
text of the FAA forecloses the argument that § 1 excludes all employment contracts from
the FAA); Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr., 489 U.S. 468, 472-73 (1989) (emphasizing
that the FAA preempts state laws hostile to arbitration, and requires that courts strictly
enforce valid contracts to arbitrate); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967) (directing that under the FAA a court must order arbitration to
proceed once it finds a valid arbitration agreement under general state contract law).
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differently than other contracts or is otherwise hostile to arbitration. 195 The
FAA, therefore, preempts state attempts to preclude enforcement of
arbitration clauses in MH contracts that affect interstate commerce. 196 In
addition, the Court has narrowed the class of contractual challenges to
1 97
arbitration that a court may determine as "gateway" arbitrability questions.
A. Dwindling Success of Challengesto Arbitration Clauses Under the
MMWA
1. Courts' GeneralAcceptance That MMWA Claims May Be
Subject to Arbitration Under the FAA
The arbitration of statutory claims highlights the tensions between
private lawmaking and public rights. Some commentators argue that
corporate insiders' use of arbitration's private scheme improperly inhibits
consumers' vindication and courts' development of public or statutory
rights. 198 MH consumers use this argument with respect to warranty claims
under the MMWA. 19 9 The MMWA seeks to prevent deception, improve the
adequacy of information provided to consumers, and promote competition in

195 See Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 684 (1996) (confirming the
FAA's application in federal and state courts to all contracts within the vast preemptive
power of the Commerce Clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,
272 (1995) (same); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 489 (1987) (same); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15-21 (1984) (same).
196 Some states limit or preclude binding arbitration of consumer warranty claims.

See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-7A-1, 44-7A-5 (Michie 2004) (barring under the state's
UAA any "disabling civil dispute clause" that limits "procedural rights necessary or
useful to a consumer, borrower, tenant[,] or employee in the enforcement of substantive
rights against a party drafting a standard form contract or lease"). Such state restrictions
on enforceability of arbitration, however, are preempted by the FAA with respect to
contracts within Congress's Commerce Clause powers. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 14.
197 See Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)
(emphasizing the narrow scope of issues that must be determined by the court in holding
that an arbitrator must determine whether a dispute is barred by the limit in the NASD's
arbitration procedures).
198 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 160, at 1, 5-22, 97-104 (discussing the effect of
arbitration on consumers' access to class relief and proposing that companies should not
be permitted to hinder consumers' vindication of statutory rights by clandestinely
precluding their class actions).
199 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1998); see also supra Part I.A (discussing the use of
arbitration to limit warranty liability in MH industry).
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the marketing of consumer products. 200 To that end, the Act provides for a
federal cause of action to enforce minimum standards for written warranties
designated as full or limited.20 1 Consumers complain that arbitration
frustrates these goals by allowing violators to avoid public disclosure and
accountability while simultaneously perpetuating contracting imbalances that
202
result in warranty abuses.
This conflict, along with the Act's language and history, drives some
courts to hold that the MMWA bars binding arbitration of warranty claims
under the Act. They emphasize that the Act only allows a warrantor to
establish "an informal dispute settlement procedure." 20 3 They further explain
that any such procedure must comply with Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
4
requirements, which specify that these procedures must be non-binding. 20
The FTC regulations state that binding arbitration is not an "informal dispute
settlement procedure," and, therefore, "reference within the written warranty
to any binding, non-judicial remedy is prohibited by the Rule and the
Act.

20 5

200 15 U.S.C. § 2302(a); Mace E. Gunter, Can Warrantors Make an End Run? The
Magnuson-Moss Act and Mandatory Arbitration in Written Warranties, 34 GA. L. REV.
1483, 1487-89 (2000) (discussing purpose and history of MMWA).
201 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3).
202 See id.; see also Lamis, supra note 143, at 173-84 (arguing that the text,
legislative history, and purposes of the MMWA should drive courts to refuse to enforce
binding arbitration of MMWA claims); Garrett S. Taylor, Read the Fine Print-Alabama
Supreme Court Rules that Binding Arbitration Provisions in Written Warranties Are
Okay, 2001 J. Disp. RESOL. 165, 172-76 (disagreeing with the Alabama Supreme Court's
decision in Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131 (Ala. 2000), to overturn
its year-old decision and now hold MMWA claims arbitrable).
203 15 U.S.C. § 2310(a)(3).

204 Id.; see also Browne v. Kline Tysons Imports, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833
(E.D. Va. 2002) (holding MMWA precludes binding arbitration of warranty claims under
the Act); Pitchford v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 2d 958, 962-65 (W.D.
Va. 2000) (refusing to enforce arbitration of MH warranty claims under the MMWA due
to the Act's intent to encourage alternative dispute settlement while not depriving any
party of the right to vindicate warranty rights in court); Borowiec v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,
772 N.E.2d 256, 263 (11. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that the MMWA precludes binding
arbitration of express warranty claims); Parkerson v. Smith, 817 So. 2d 529, 539 (Miss.
2002) (holding that express warranty claims under the MMWA may not be subject to
binding arbitration); Lamis, supra note 143, at 240-41 ("The very essence of the statute
was tied up with the legislative recognition that consumers were involuntarily subjected
to the terms of a warranty.") (emphasis added).
205 FTC Rules, Regulations, Statements and Interpretations under Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 40 Fed. Reg. 60,168, 60,211 (Dec. 31, 1975); see also 16 C.F.R. § 700.8
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The Supreme Court, however, has endorsed arbitrability of statutory
claims and has rarely found that a statute provides clear congressional
direction to the contrary. 20 6 Although the Court has not addressed the
arbitrability of MMWA claims, it has upheld arbitration of consumer claims
under TILA and employment claims under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). 20 7 The Court also rejected federal agency
statements indicating that the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO) and ADEA claims should not be subject to
binding arbitration. 20 8 Most courts have seen this as a signal that MH
consumers who agree to broad arbitration provisions must arbitrate their
20 9
MMWA claims.
(2000) (stating that warrantors may not require binding arbitration); 16 C.F.R. § 703.5(j)
(precluding binding arbitration).
206 See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989) (applying the FAA's "strong endorsement" of arbitration to encompass statutory
claims). The Supreme Court has clearly stated that statutory rights are arbitrable, unless
the statute forbids arbitration or arbitration will prevent a claimant from vindicating
statutory rights. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 27 (1991) (finding
claims under the ADEA arbitrable). In deciding whether a statute forbids arbitration, a
court must consider the text of the statute, its legislative history, and whether arbitration
clearly conflicts with the statute's purpose. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220, 227 (1987).
207 Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89-92 (2000) (confirming
parties' duty to arbitrate TILA claims under MH financing contract despite unclear
arbitration costs); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (rejecting claims that arbitration favors
employers and is not subject to sufficient judicial review to ensure fundamental fairness);
see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (holding that the
FAA preempts contrary state law to require arbitration of state common law and statutory
claims, including employment discrimination claims).
208 See Katie Wiechens, Arbitrating Consumer Claims Under the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 1459, 1464 (2001) (discussing the Supreme Court's
treatment of agency statements in McMahon, in which the Court refused to follow an
SEC regulation barring arbitration of claims under the Securities Exchange Act, and
noting the Court's rejection in Gilmer of EEOC indications that it deemed ADEA claims
inarbitrable).
209 See Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1278 (11th Cir.
2002) (holding that the MMWA does not preclude binding arbitration under the FAA);
Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 476-79 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding
MMWA claims arbitrable); Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131, 114145 (Ala. 2000) (holding that the MMWA does not invalidate all arbitration clauses);
Stacy David, Inc. v. Consuegra, 845 So. 2d 303, 306-07 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003)
(finding that MMWA claims are subject to binding arbitration agreements); Results
Oriented, Inc. v. Crawford, 538 S.E.2d 73, 81 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (same); In re Am.
Homestar of Lancaster, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480, 492 (Tex. 2001) (same). Full discussion of
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Accordingly, most courts find that the MMWA's reference to informal
dispute settlement procedures has no bearing on binding arbitration
agreements under the FAA. 2 10 These courts opine that the Act's text is
"ambiguous at most" regarding binding arbitration because it only addresses
"internal dispute settlement procedures." 2 11 These courts also find that FTC
regulations barring binding arbitration of MMWA claims deserve no
deference because they are unreasonable in light of the Supreme Court's proarbitration policy. 212 These same courts also conclude that binding
arbitration does not conflict with MMWA purposes. 2 13 They do not seem
bothered by consumers' inability to challenge the operation of an allegedly
2 14
unfair dispute settlement procedure under state law.

arbitrability of MMWA claims and alleged conflict between the MMWA and the FAA is
beyond the scope of this article, as it has been addressed by many commentators. See,
e.g., Katherine R. Guerin, Clash of the Federal Titans: The Federal Arbitration Act v.
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Will the Consumer Win or Lose?, 13 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 4, 5-30 (2001) (discussing conflicting cases and the arbitrability of
MMWA claims); Ryan Kauffman, Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, Inc.:
Will Consumers Be Required to Arbitrate Their Magnuson-Moss Claims?, 19 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 361, 361-85 (2002) (same); Lamis, supra note 143, at 173, 175-248
(same); Shelly Smith, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts: Consumer
Protection and the Circumvention of the Judicial System, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191,
1198-1250 (2001) (same); Wiechens, supra note 208, at 1460-86 (same).
2 10
See Davis, 305 F.3d at 1275 (finding that the MMWA's text does not directly
address binding arbitration, and its regulation of informal dispute settlement procedures
"does not mean that the Act precludes a court from enforcing a valid binding arbitration
agreement").
211 Id.
212 See id. at 1276; see also Lamis, supra note 143, at 173-95, 214-44 (discussing
and critiquing cases addressing arbitrability of MMWA claims); Wiechens supra note
208, at 1466-78 (discussing courts' approaches to the FIC regulations).
213 See, e.g., Davis, 305 F.3d at 1279-80 (emphasizing FTC regulations are
unreasonable in light of the Court's holdings that "arbitration is favorable to the
individual"); Wiechens, supra note 208, at 1475-77 (noting that the Court endorsed
arbitration of consumer protection claims in Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S.
79, 88-92 (2000)).
214 Wolf v. Ford Motor Co., 829 F.2d 1277, 1279-80 (4th Cir. 1987) (holding that
the MMWA preempted state fraud action challenging operation of dispute settlement
procedure because the Act grants the FTC authority to ensure compliance with its
minimum standards). The MMWA grants the FrC authority to investigate complaints
regarding manufacturers' dispute settlement procedures, and allows the FTC to seek
remedial action, including injunction proceedings, against a non-complying procedure. 15
U.S.C. §§ 2310(a)(4), 2310(c)(1).
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As the Comments to the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (RUAA)
explain, "arbitration is a consensual process in which autonomy of the parties
who enter into arbitration agreements should be given primary consideration,
2 15
so long as their agreements conform to notions of fundamental fairness."
The question is whether and when MH arbitral regimes are in fact
"consensual" and "conform to notions of fundamental fairness." Fairness
aside, current uncertainty regarding arbitrability of MH consumers' MMWA
claims diminishes arguable efficiencies by hindering insiders' from
anticipating and passing on economic savings to consumers from their
arbitration programs. 2 16 Furthermore, consumers and insiders suffer needless
delays and costs when they must pursue MMWA litigation and breach of
contract arbitration on the same issues. 2 17 Indeed, the courts also suffer when
their dockets are clogged with redundant litigation and consumer challenges
of arbitration agreements.
2. Some Courts' Willingness to Void ParticularArbitration
ProvisionsThat Clash with MMWA Rights
Due to the limited success of generalized attacks on arbitrability of
MMWA claims, consumers increasingly challenge arbitration agreements on
the basis that a particular agreement violates or improperly curtails their
rights under the Act. 2 18 Using the Supreme Court's words, consumers argue
that an arbitration provision does not allow them "effectively [to] vindicate
[their] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum." 2 19 The question then
215 Christopher R. Drahozal, ContractingAround RUAA: Default Rules, Mandatory
Rules, and Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 3 PEPP. DiSP. RESOL. L.J. 419, 421-22
(2003) (quoting the official Comments to the RUAA).
216 See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 476-79 (5th Cir. 2002)
(recognizing courts' disagreement regarding enforcement of binding arbitration of
MMWA claims).
217 See, e.g., Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 730-35 (Ala. 2002) (allowing
litigation of MMWA claims, but ordering arbitration of remaining claims under MH sales
agreement).
218 See id. at 728-30 (arguing by consumer that even if MMWA claims may be
arbitrable, the arbitration clause in this case was unenforceable under the MMWA
because it was not disclosed in the written MH warranty and it precluded the consumers
from vindicating their statutory rights by burdening them with costs of arbitration).
2 19

See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL,

COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND

PROBLEMS 191-204 (2002) (quoting the Court in Gilmer and addressing how parties
challenge arbitration of statutory claims based on procedures required by a particular
arbitration agreement).
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becomes whether an arbitration provision allows a claimant to vindicate
rights provided by the MMWA.
In some cases, consumers argue that an arbitration provision violates the
MMWA because it is not properly disclosed in a written warranty. 220 In Ex
Parte Thicklin, for example, a MH buyer sought to vacate an order
compelling arbitration of her MMWA claims against a MH seller and
manufacturer. 22 1 Not long before Thicklin, the Alabama Supreme Court had
fluctuated on the arbitrability of MMWA claims. 222 The Thicklin court,
therefore, first clarified that MMWA claims generally are arbitrable. The
court held, however, that the Act precluded arbitration of the consumer's
express warranty claims because the arbitration provision in his case was in
his MH purchase agreement, but not in the manufacturer's separate written
warranty. 223 The court concluded that failure to disclose the arbitration
requirement in the written warranty violated the MMWA's consumer
224
disclosure provisions.
Like the Alabama court, the Federal Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit also has drawn fine distinctions among warranty claims in
determining their arbitrability under the MMWA. Prior to 2002, the Eleventh
Circuit had indicated in dicta that the MMWA precluded arbitration of
written warranty claims, although it allowed arbitration of implied and oral

220 See Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at 728-29 (finding that the particular arbitration clause
violated the MMWA).
221 id. at 726-28.

222 Id. at 728-29; Southern Energy Homes, Inc. v. Ard, 772 So. 2d 1131, 1134 (Ala.
2000). The opinions in Alabama concerning MH warranty claims are confusing. See, e.g.,
Hutchens, supra note 133, at 599-603 (noting the myriad of political issues regarding
arbitration in Alabama); Ware, supra note 147, at 606-10 (discussing how Alabama
Supreme Court judges' votes on arbitration issues coincide with whether they are
supported by business and corporate interests and finding that in all nine cases regarding
interpretation of arbitration clauses decided prior to the period when "plaintiff's-lawyerfunded justices held a majority on the court," a majority of justices found the claims
inarbitrable, while in all four cases after "business-funded justices gained a majority on
the court," the court upheld arbitration of the claims at issue).
223 Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at 728-31 (relying on Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of
Georgia,Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 623-24 (11 th Cir. 2001)).
224 Id. at 728-30; see also Homes of Legend, Inc. v. McCollough, 776 So. 2d 741,
746-48 (Ala. 2000) (finding that, although an arbitration clause required compliance with
the AAA rules that called for binding arbitration, the clause should be construed to
require nonbinding arbitration in light of the contract's warranty requiring compliance
with FFC regulations, which the court read to preclude binding arbitration of MMWA
claims).
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express warranty claims. 22 5 In 2002, however, the court held that the
MMWA does not preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements contained
in written warranties. 226 Nonetheless, the court concluded that a MH
manufacturer could not compel arbitration based on its third-party
beneficiary status under an arbitration clause in a MH retail agreement
separate from the written warranty. 227 The court emphasized that this
"unique" contractual arrangement violated MMWA disclosure obligations by
"failing to disclose in a single document all relevant terms of the
warranty."

22 8

Consumers also argue that particular arbitration provisions preclude their
vindication of MMWA rights by improperly limiting or excluding remedies
or procedures otherwise available to consumers under the Act. 229 For
example, MH consumers have challenged arbitration agreements that
preclude recovery of attorneys' fees and class relief remedies that would be
available to consumers pursuing MMWA claims in court. 230 They also have

225 See Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir.
2001) (finding that any arguable preference for nonbinding arbitration under the MMWA
only applies to written warranties, and does not preclude binding arbitration of oral
express warranty claims); Cunningham, 253 F.3d at 616-20 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (intimating
that written warranty claims are not arbitrable under the MMWA, but finding that the
mention of nonbinding arbitration in the MMWA text does not preclude binding
arbitration of all MMWA claims).
226 Davis v. Southern Energy Homes, Inc., 305 F.3d 1268, 1271-72 (11 th Cir. 2002)
(holding that "the MMWA permits the enforcement of valid binding arbitration
agreements within written warranties").
227 Cunningham, 253 F.3d at 622-23.
228 Id. at 622. The court reiterated that it was not deciding whether MMWA claims
may be subject to binding arbitration when properly disclosed in a written warranty. Id. at
623. Nonetheless, shortly after the court decided Cunningham, it concluded in
Richardson that oral express warranty claims under the MMWA claims may be subject to
binding arbitration. Richardson,254 F.3d at 1327.
229 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) (denying a MH
consumer's challenge of arbitration based on potential arbitration costs but
acknowledging that consumer may be able to show high arbitration costs would make her
"unable to vindicate her statutory rights in arbitration"); see also Thicklin, 824 So. 2d at
730-31 (arguing by consumer that the arbitration clause violated the MMWA by
imposing costs of arbitration on consumers seeking to vindicate statutory rights).
230 See Consumers Union, supra note 142 (discussing costs and procedures that
create "tremendous perils for consumers"); see also supra note 155 (discussing
arbitration costs).
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attacked arbitration agreements that bar an arbitrator from awarding statutory
23 1
punitive and treble damages.
In addition, MH consumers have argued that arbitration agreements
requiring consumers to bear their own costs effectively preclude them from
bringing their statutory claims. 232 A MH consumer in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Randolph launched this type of "prohibitive cost" attack on
arbitrability of claims. 2 33 The Court rejected the consumer's attack, however,
because her arbitration agreement's silence regarding costs did not establish
that she would in fact be required to pay prohibitively high costs.234 This
235
requisite showing of prohibitive costs remains a mystery.
As with generalized attacks on the arbitrability of MMWA claims, these
particularized challenges are fraught with uncertainties and inefficiencies.
Consumers who succeed often must arbitrate contract and tort claims before
they may litigate the MMWA claims. 236 A court also may compel arbitration
of implied and oral warranty claims, although it allows consumers to litigate
written warranty claims. 23 7 In addition, courts may order consumers to
231 See Anders v. Hometown Mortgage Service, Inc., 346 F.3d 1024, 1027-33 (1 1th
Cir. 2003) (ordering arbitration and holding that an arbitrator must decide mortgagors'
argument that an arbitration provision precluding mortgagors from recovering statutory
punitive and treble damages violated TILA and the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (RESPA)).
232 See generally Randolph, 531 U.S. at 79 (challenging by MH consumers of
enforceability of arbitration agreement as to TILA claims where the agreement was
ambiguous regarding who must pay arbitration costs); see also supra notes 154-60 and
accompanying text (discussing cost challenges).
233 Randolph, 531 U.S. at 89-92. This is a separate argument from the
unconscionability and other contract defense arguments discussed below, because the
argument is directed at whether a consumer is precluded from vindicating statutory or
public rights, and is not directed at the enforceability of the arbitration agreement as to all
claims under a contract. See id. (challenging arbitrability of TILA claims under this
argument). Presumably, this means that a consumer who succeeds on such a challenge
with respect to a statutory claim may nonetheless be compelled to arbitrate other claims
arising under the contract.
234 Id. at 89-91. The Court seems to adopt a "wait-and-see" attitude.
235 Id. at 90-93; see also Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 730 (Ala. 2002)
(disregarding MH consumer's claims that the arbitration clause in her sales and financing
contract was unenforceable because it imposed costs and expenses that would preclude
her from pursuing MMWA statutory claims).
236 Browne v. Kline Tysons Imp., Inc., 190 F. Supp. 2d 827, 833 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(allowing litigation of MMWA claims, but ordering arbitration of TILA and state
statutory and common law claims arising out of an automobile sale).
237 See Richardson v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 254 F.3d 1321, 1323-26 (1lth Cir.
2001) (noting that the MH consumers had been compelled to arbitrate implied warranty
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arbitrate warranty claims against some, but not all, of the parties who may
bear responsibility for the claims. 23 8 For example, a court may compel MH
consumers to arbitrate claims against a retailer, but not MMWA claims
against the manufacturer. 239 This uncertain enforcement and allowance for
parallel litigation and arbitration results in inefficiencies for all. disputants
and the courts.
B. Uncertain Challenges to Arbitration Based on ContractDefenses
Hurdles to arbitrability challenges based on the MMWA have relegated
240
MH consumers' prime attacks on arbitration to contract defenses.
Consumers must argue that their arbitration agreements are unenforceable
based on contract defenses such as unconscionability, fraud, and lack of

claims against the MH retailer, and that the MMWA arguably would only preclude
binding arbitration of written warranty claims-although the same court later upheld the
enforceability of arbitration agreements contained within written warranties);
Cunningham v. Fleetwood Homes of Georgia, Inc., 253 F.3d 611, 612, 623-24 (11 th Cir.
2001) (noting that the MH consumers were required to arbitrate their fraud, mental
anguish and emotional distress, negligence and wantonness, breach of contract, breach of
implied warranty, and violation of the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability
Doctrine claims, but holding they were not required to arbitrate their written and express
warranty claims against the MH manufacturer).
238 Some courts use third-party beneficiary and estoppel principles to compel
consumers to arbitrate claims against both signatories and non-signatories to contracts
containing arbitration clauses. See Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Ala. 1996)
(enforcing arbitration against a consumer on behalf of non-signatory manufacturer based
on broad arbitration clause). But see Ex parte Jones, 686 So. 2d 1166, 1166-68 (Ala.
1996) (withdrawing a prior opinion, and holding that there was no agreement to arbitrate
between consumers and the non-signatory to the arbitration agreement); Ex parte Martin,
703 So. 2d 883, 889 (Ala. 1996) (holding that an arbitration clause in a loan agreement
between buyers and sellers did not apply to manufacturer); see also David F. Sawrie,
Equitable Estoppel and the Outer Boundaries of FederalArbitration Law: The Alabama
Supreme Court's Retrenchment of an Expansive Federal Policy FavoringArbitration,51
VAND. L. REv. 721, 723-51 (1998) (discussing the application of estoppel in enforcing
arbitration agreements and Alabama courts' struggle with these estoppel issues in MH
cases).
239 The MH consumers in Cunningham had been compelled to arbitrate all of their
claims against the retailer and manufacturer, except for their written and express warranty
claims against the manufacturer, based on their arbitration agreement with the retailer.
Cunningham, 253 F.3d at 613, 623-24. The court accepted the manufacturer's third-party
beneficiary status under the consumer retail agreement. Id. at 613-14.
240 See supra notes 194-97 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's
relegation of consumer challenges of arbitration agreements to contract defenses).
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consideration. 24 1 The Supreme Court has also narrowed these challenges to
those aimed exclusively at an arbitration clause, and not the underlying
agreement. 242 Courts have confirmed that consumers may not successfully
challenge arbitration as "inherently unfair to consumers" or an automatically
voidable product of unequal bargaining power.24 3 Instead, consumers
pursuing a contract defense must prove the elements of the defense under
24
contract law.
1. Unconscionability
Consumers often raise tandem unconscionability and particularized
MMWA arguments based on essentially the same facts. 245 A consumer
challenging an arbitration agreement as unconscionable, however, generally
must show that the agreement is both substantively and procedurally
unconscionable. 246 Procedural unconscionability asks whether the bargaining
process was unduly one-sided, whereas substantive unconscionability
focuses on whether the terms of an arbitration provision are oppressive or

241 See Walton v. Rose Mobile Homes LLC, 298 F.3d 470, 478 (5th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting MH consumers' challenge of arbitration under the MMWA, but emphasizing
that "courts can consider individual claims of fraud or unconscionability in arbitration
agreements as they would in any other contract").
242 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04, 411,
421-23 (1967) (applying "separability" to find courts may only consider attacks on an
arbitration clause and not those aimed at an underlying contract).
243 See Walton, 298 F.3d at 478 (citing Allied-Bruce Tenninix Cos. v. Dobson, 513
U.S. 265, 280 (1995)).
244 Id.
245 See Ex parte Thicklin, 824 So. 2d 723, 730-34 (Ala. 2002) (launching by
consumer of statutory and unconscionability attacks on arbitration); Rickard v. Teynor's
Homes, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 2d 910, 914-15 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (addressing MH purchaser's
challenge of an arbitration agreement as unconscionable and as a violation of the
MMWA).
246 A court may invalidate all or part of an arbitration agreement on the basis of
unconscionability, and often challengers argue that an arbitration agreement's provisions
are unconscionable because they unduly curtail statutory remedies or procedures. See
Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that
the one-year limitation on claims under arbitration agreement in employment contract
was substantively unconscionable because it deprived employees of the benefit of the
continuing violations doctrine available under a state employment discrimination statute);
see also Alexander v. Anthony Int'l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256, 264-70 (3rd Cir. 2003) (noting
both elements of unconscionability under most state contract law).
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otherwise unfair. 247 MH consumers may satisfy the procedural
unconscionability prong by showing their arbitration provision was in a MH
insider's preprinted form. 248 Furthermore, many MH insiders bury arbitration
provisions in package deals that consumers accept as conditions to buying
2 49
homes.
The adhesive nature of a MH agreement, however, does not necessarily
void the contract. 250 Instead, a consumer also must satisfy the substantive
prong of the unconscionability defense by showing that an arbitration
agreement requires unduly oppressive or unreasonable terms. 25 1 Examples of
arbitration terms that courts have held substantively unconscionable include
terms giving the stronger bargaining party an option to litigate, imposing
high arbitration costs and fees, requiring consumers to arbitrate in
inconvenient locations, and strictly limiting damages and remedies.2 52 In one
case, for example, a MH purchaser challenged a retailer's motion to compel
arbitration on the basis that the arbitration agreement was unconscionable
because it allowed the retailer to choose the arbitrator. 253 The court held that
247 See Alexander, 341 F.3d at 265-66 (finding that a "take-it-or-leave-it" contract
prepared by the employer without negotiation by the employees was procedurally
unconscionable).
248 See supra Part II.B.2.a (discussing dominant bargaining power of MH insiders
over consumers); see also Alexander, 341 F.3d at 265 (describing adhesion contracts).
"249 See supra notes 87-88 (discussing high-pressure package deals in MH
transactions).
250 Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 870 (D. Or. 2002)
(emphasizing that adhesion contracts are not necessarily unenforceable).
251 Hammond, supra note 184, at 602-04 (discussing the Court's adoption of a
"contractual approach" for determining enforceability of arbitration agreements and the
two-prong unconscionability analysis that requires substantive and procedural
unfairness).
252 See DRAHOZAL, supra note 219, at 113-14 (stating a list of suspect terms and
compiling supporting cases indicating courts' disagreement on the unconscionability of
these terms).
253 Harold Allen's Mobile Home Factory Outlet, Inc. v. Butler, 825 So. 2d 779, 781
(Ala. 2002). With respect to arbitrator selection, the arbitration clause provided:
The SELLER shall have the right to select an arbitratorwho shall arbitrate any
disagreement, claim, demand or other dispute between the SELLER and the
BUYER, having all powers as may be provided for by law, by regulation, by
legislative act or otherwise; provided, however, that no arbitratormay be selected
by the SELLER who shall have provided legal representationalservices to orfor the
SELLER at any time.
Id. (emphasis original). The court observed that the "paucity of precedent in this area of
the law bespeaks a commendable lack of chutzpah on the part of the business
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the arbitrator selection provision was unconscionable as a matter of law
because it "offended fundamental notions of fairness" in such a way that "no
sensible person with a range of choices would agree to." 254 The court
distinguished selection provisions that condition arbitrator selection on the
other party's consent. 255 The court also narrowed the consumer's remedy by
affirming the trial court's order to arbitrate with a court-appointed
256
arbitrator.
These unconscionability cases are uncertain at best. Courts seem to
increasingly deny MH consumers' unconscionability arguments. 257 For
example, the Alabama Supreme Court shifted its view since 1998 to curtail
unconscionability challenges of arbitration agreements. 25 8 In one recent case,
community." Id. at 785. Presumably, this provision would have been valid if it had not
been the product of procedural unconscionability, but the court assumes the adhesive
nature of MH transactions. See id. at 786 (See, J.,concurring) (emphasizing that this
agreement would be enforceable if it were not "one of adhesion").
254 Id. at 784.
255 Id. at 783-84 (citing MH cases upholding such provisions); see also supra note
52 (discussing Conseco's form agreement, which allowed Conseco to choose the
arbitrator, subject to the MH consumer's consent).
256 Butler, 825 So. 2d at 785.
257 See, e.g., Fleetwood Enters., Inc. v. Gaskamp, 280 F.3d 1069, 1077 (5th Cir.
2002) (denying an unconscionability challenge to MH arbitration agreement); Conseco
Fin. Corp. v. Boone, 838 So. 2d 370, 372-73 (Ala. 2002) (denying a challenge of MH
arbitration agreement based on remedy and damage limitations); Green Tree Fin. Corp. v.
Lewis, 813 So. 2d 820, 825 (Ala. 2001) (denying an unconscionability challenge to
arbitration clause by illiterate MH consumer); Johnnie's Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 790 So. 2d
956, 963-65 (Ala. 2001) (enforcing the MH consumer's duty to arbitrate warranty, fraud,
breach, and other claims arising out of MH purchase); Crawford v. Results Oriented, Inc.,
548 S.E.2d 342, 343 (Ga. 2001) (denying an MH consumer's arbitrability challenge
based on risk of high arbitration costs); Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47
S.W.3d 335, 342-45 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding Conseco's form arbitration
provision with carve-out for lender actions and unknown costs); Garcia v. Wayne Homes,
LLC, No. 2001CA53, 2002 Ohio App. LEXIS 1917, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2002)
(denying an unconscionability challenge based on risk of prohibitive arbitration costs); In
re Firstmerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756-58 (Tex. 2001) (denying an
unconscionability challenge to MH arbitration despite carve-out for lender actions and
evidence of high arbitration costs);. But see Mendez v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., 45 P.3d
594, 604-07 (Wash. Ct. App. 2002) (holding an arbitration clause in a MH consumer
contract unconscionable due to prohibitive arbitration costs where consumer showed that
it would be economically infeasible for him to arbitrate his $1,500 claim because he
earned only $12,000 per year and arbitration would cost roughly $2,000).
258 See Ware, supra note 147, at 620-21 (analyzing Alabama arbitration cases and
concluding that, "Unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements have fared
poorly in the Supreme Court of Alabama since March 23, 1998, when business-funded
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the court denied a MH consumer's unconscionability challenge to an
arbitration provision, even though the consumer had only a sixth-grade
2 59
education and did not understand the terms of his adhesive MH agreement.
The court also found the provision fully enforceable despite its carve-out
allowing the retailer and lender or assignee to go directly to court for
collection actions. 2 60 Furthermore, the court refused to void the provision's
requirement that the low-income consumer pay a $2,000 filing fee to even
26
initiate arbitration. '

2. Fraudand Misrepresentation
Fraud and misrepresentation are additional contract defenses consumers
use to challenge arbitration agreements. Often consumers argue these
defenses in conjunction with unconscionability. 262 Fraud, however, is
especially difficult to prove, and, as with all contract defenses, a court will
not hear a fraud challenge to arbitration unless the alleged fraud is
specifically directed to the arbitration clause. 26 3 To prevail on a fraud claim,
a consumer generally must show:
(1) that a material representation was made; (2) the representation was false;
(3) when the representation was made, the speaker knew it was false or
made it recklessly without any knowledge of the truth and as a positive
assertion; (4) the speaker made the representation with the intent that the

justices gained a majority on the court"); Hutchens, supra note 133, at 608-10
(discussing Alabama cases denying challenges based on high arbitration costs).
259 Johnnie's Homes, 790 So. 2d at 960-65.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 965. Cf.Anderson v. Ashby, 873 So. 2d 168, 174-84 (Ala. 2003) (per
curiam) (finding arbitration clause in credit-life insurance transaction was unconscionable
where borrower was illiterate and form arbitration provision limited damages and
preserved lender's right to litigate foreclosure and collection claims); Leonard v.
Terminix Int'l Co., L.P., 854 So. 2d 529, 534-39 (Ala. 2002) (per curiam) (finding an
arbitration clause in an insect control contract was unconscionable because it precluded
class actions, thereby depriving consumers of a remedy by making it impracticable to
pursue the small dollar claims allowable in light of the damages limitation).
262 See, e.g., FirstmeritBank, 52 S.W.3d at 756-58 (challenging by MH consumers
of arbitration based on fraud, along with unconscionability, duress, and revocation).
263 Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402-04 (1967)
(holding per the separability doctrine that fraud in the inducement is an arbitrability
question for the court only when it goes to the arbitration clause, not the underlying
contract).
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in reliance on the
other party should act upon it; (5) the party acted 264
representation; and (6) the party thereby suffered injury.
Consumers struggle to prove these fraud elements. In In re Firstmerit
Bank, for example, MH purchasers challenged an arbitration provision in a
MH sales agreement based on allegations that the sellers fraudulently
represented their ownership of the land under the MH and existence of a
septic system and driveway. 265 The purchasers also alleged that the sellers
improperly failed to disclose or explain an arbitration addendum, and that
this was a material nondisclosure because the addendum had a carve-out
allowing the lender to judicially foreclose and repossess the MH despite the
purchasers' duty to arbitrate their breach of warranty, deceptive practices,
and other claims. 266 The court curtly denied the fraud claim, however,
sellers actually
because the purchasers had not shown that "the
267
misrepresented" the terms of the arbitration addendum.
Consumers rarely avoid arbitration based on these nondisclosure
arguments. 268 Sellers generally have no duty to disclose or explain to
consumers the significance of arbitration provisions. 269 Moreover, MH
consumers enjoy little success on such fraud challenges to arbitration despite
270
its preclusive effects on consumers' access to statutory judicial remedies.
3. Assent
A consumer generally cannot avoid arbitration based on a failure to read
or understand an arbitration clause. 27 1 However, a consumer may challenge
an arbitration clause based on a lack of voluntary consent. 272 Consumers
must show that they either never agreed to arbitrate, or that they signed an
264 FirstmeritBank, 52 S.W.3d at 758.
265 Id.

266 Id. at 752-53, 758.

267 Id. at 758.
268 See Torrance v. Aames Funding Corp., 242 F. Supp. 2d 862, 869-70 (D. Or.
2002) (denying fraud claim).
269 Id. (emphasizing no duty to disclose or explain arm's length written agreements).
270 See Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299, 1304-05 (9th Cir. 1994)
(breaking from the majority of courts by holding employee only could be compelled to
arbitrate her Title VII claims if she expressly waived her access to statutory remedies in
court).
271 Torrance, 242 F. Supp. 2d at 869-70.
272 See Ex parte Early, 806 So. 2d 1198, 1200-02 (Ala. 2001) (arguing economic
duress).
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agreement under duress. 27 3 To prove duress, a consumer generally must
provide sufficient evidence that the seller essentially forced the consumer to
accept the MH contract despite the objectionable arbitration clause. 274
In Ex parte Early, for example, the Earlys resisted arbitration under a
provision in their MH purchase installment agreement based on economic
duress. 275 Mr. Early provided an affidavit stating that he objected to the
arbitration provision in the agreement at the time he and his wife purchased
the MH. He signed the agreement, however, because the MH vendor told him
he would lose the down payment of more than $4,000 unless he agreed to the
provision and concluded the MH purchase. 276 The Earlys claimed this
acceptance was. "involuntary and under economic duress. '277 Under these
facts, the court remanded for further discovery on the duress issue because
the Earlys had provided a predicate showing of need for supporting evidence
that they could not obtain without discovery. 27 8
Assent issues also lie at the heart of MH consumers' claims that their
contracts do not incorporate arbitration provisions, or that warranty claims
exceed the scope of their arbitration provisions. 279 In Marcinko v. Palm
Harbor Homes, Inc., for example, MH consumers signed an arbitration
addendum and a MH purchase contract on different dates. They argued that
this timing difference precluded arbitration of disputes arising out of the MH
purchase. 2 80 The court rejected their argument, however, because the
purchase contract incorporated the arbitration provision. 28 1 The court held
that this incorporation was sufficient to indicate consumers' assent to

273 Id. at 1201-02.
274 Id. at 1202.
275 Id. at 1200.
276 Id. at 1202.
277 Id.

278 Id. at 1202-03. In its opinion, however, the court seems to decree a higher level
of consent regarding arbitration than for other contract terms. The court states that an
arbitration agreement "is a waiver of a party's right to a jury trial," and any waiver must
be made "knowingly, willingly and voluntarily." Id. at 1201. This is a higher standard
than most courts apply. See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Lewis, 813 So. 2d 820, 825 (Ala.
2001) (denying unconscionability challenge to arbitration clause by illiterate MH
consumer).
27 9
See Marcinko v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., No. 01CA677, 2002 WL 1438658,
*3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 21, 2002) (arguing by MH consumers that arbitration agreement
never became part of the MH purchase contract).
280 Id. at *2-3.
281 Id. at *3-4.
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arbitrate their breach, fraud, and sales practices claims against the MH
282
vendor.
Other assent challenges to arbitration aim to preclude arbitration of
certain claims, or claims against nonsignatories to an agreement. 283 In Ex
parte Gates, for example, MH consumers unsuccessfully argued that an
arbitration clause on the back of their MH retail installment contract did not
cover fraud, negligence, warranty, and MMWA claims against the retailer
and the manufacturer of the MH. 284 The clause covered "[a]ll disputes,
claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this Contract or the
relationships which result from this Contract, or the validity of this
arbitration clause or the entire Contract ....",285 A court could have
interpreted "this Contract" to narrowly cover only breach of contract claims
against the signatory retailer. Instead, this court found the language broadly
covered all the consumers' claims against the retailer and the nonsignatory
manufacturer because all the claims were "asserted in connection with" the
286
retail contract.
Courts disagree regarding these assent cases, especially with respect to
third-party claims. The Alabama Supreme Court alone shifted its view on the
third-party issue after Gates.287 In Ex parte Jones, the Court first held that
the broad arbitration clause in a car loan agreement covered the consumers'
claims against their car insurance provider because the provider sold and
financed the insurance in conjunction with the loan agreement. 288 After a
282 Id. at *4 (indicating no higher level of consent necessary to waive trial rights).
283 See Ex parte Gates, 675 So. 2d 371, 374-75 (Ala. 1996) (arguing by MH
consumers that misrepresentation and warranty claims against MH retailer and
manufacturer were outside the scope of an arbitration clause in their sale and financing
agreement).
284 Id. at 373-75. The contract was signed by Gates and the general manager of the
retailer in his representative capacity, and referred to the retailer as the "Seller, Secured
Party," and Green Tree Financial Corporation as the "assignee." Id. at 373.
285 Id.
286
Id. at 374-75. The court found the claims within the scope of the agreement in
connection with finding that the FAA preempted Alabama law precluding enforcement of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Id.
287 See supra notes 147, 222 and 258 (discussing Professor Ware's findings
regarding the Alabama Supreme Court's arguably conflicting decisions regarding scope
of arbitration agreements, and the decisions' relationship to the politics of the court);
supra notes 193, 202 and accompanying text (discussing the same court's struggles and
quick reversal on the arbitrability of MMWA claims).
288 Ex parte Jones, 686 So. 2d 1166, 1168-71 (Ala. 1996) (Maddox, J., dissenting)
(quoting from the court's original opinion issued May 31, 1996, but withdrawn and
substituted September 13, 1996 after reh'g ex mero motu).
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rehearing ex mero motu, however, a majority of the Court withdrew the
original opinion, and held that the arbitration clause did not apply to claims
against the insurer with whom the consumers never agreed to arbitrate. 289
The majority did not cite or discuss the Court's prior opinion in Gates.290
The dissent argued that Gates established broad interpretation of such
arbitration agreements to cover claims against third parties arising out of the
291
transaction containing the arbitration agreement.
Less than two months later, in Ex parte Martin, the Alabama Supreme
Court again faced the question of whether an arbitration agreement covered
claims against non-signatories to the agreement. 29 2 In that case, MH
consumers sought to vacate an order compelling them to arbitrate warranty
claims against a MH manufacturer. The arbitration clause in the consumers'
MH purchase agreement covered claims "arising out. of or relating to that
contract, or breach thereof, between [the retailer] and [the
consumers] ....,,293 The Court distinguished Gates on grounds that the
arbitration agreement "was particularly broad, encompassing not only the
'disputes, claims, or controversies arising from' the contract, but also 'the
relationships' that resulted from it."' 294 The Court summarily concluded the
agreement at issue was narrower than that in Gates, and therefore the
29 5
consumers did not have to arbitrate their claims against the manufacturer.
In all of these cases, the majority opinions focused on assent or contract
interpretation issues. Another way to approach these third-party cases is to
analyze enforceability under an estoppel theory. Estoppel principles
289 Id. at 1167-68 (emphasizing that the written arbitration agreement referred to
"creditor and debtor," and thus was limited to disputes between those parties).
290 Id. at 1168 (emphasizing that one "cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute he has not agreed to submit") (quoting Old Republic Ins. Co. v. Lanier, 644
So. 2d 1258, 1260 (Ala. 1994)).
291 Id. at 1170-71 (emphasizing that the arbitration clause broadly covered "[a]ll
disputes, controversies or claims of any kind and nature between creditor and debtor
arising out of or in connection with the within agreement") (emphasis original). Justice
Maddox also lamented that the court "changed its mind" after the Gates opinion had been
criticized in the Alabama Trial Lawyers Journal, seemingly intimating that the court had
been swayed by politics and public opinion. Id.
292 Exparte Martin, 703 So. 2d 883, 884-85 (Ala. 1996).
293 Id. at 885.
294 Id. at 885-86.

295 Id. at 887. As the dissent pointed out, the Gates language was not very different
from the instant language in that the consumers agreed to arbitrate not only claims
"arising out of," but also those "relating to that contract, or breach thereof' between
them and the MH retailer. Id. at 888-89 (Hooper, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis original).
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generally call courts to compel a signatory to an arbitration agreement to
arbitrate claims against a non-signatory if the signatory must rely on the
agreement in asserting the claims, or if the signatory's allegations involve
substantially interdependent and concerted misconduct by the non-signatory
with a signatory to the agreement. 296 Courts may compel a signatory to
arbitrate in these cases because at least a signatory agreed to arbitrate with
someone. Courts constrain their compulsion of non-signatories, however, to
cases where it is proper to compel arbitration on agency, assumption, alter
297
ego, or circumscribed estoppel grounds.
The third-party issues raise thorny questions for MH warranty claimants
because MH transactions typically involve multiple parties and contracts. If
an arbitration agreement appears only in the MH sales or financing
agreement, then questions arise regarding the consumers' duties to arbitrate
warranty and MMWA claims against the manufacturer. Furthermore,
confusing judicial analysis of these questions causes inefficiencies, especially
when the analysis results in parallel litigation and arbitration.
4. Lack of Consideration
Another uncertain and fact-specific challenge to arbitration is lack of
consideration. It is generally not very difficult for proponents of arbitration to
show adequate consideration. Proponents need only show that the arbitration
provision is mutual or that it is part of a larger exchange (e.g., the arbitration
clause is one of many promises parties exchange in a MH transaction). MH
consumers nonetheless launch lack of consideration attacks.
In one case, MH consumers alleged the separate arbitration provision
was not supported by adequate consideration because they signed the
purchase agreement and arbitration provision at different times. 298 The court
dismissed the lack of consideration defense because the consumers had not
properly preserved the defense in the lower court. 299 However, it seems the
court would have denied the defense on the merits in light of its finding that
296 See MS Dealer Serv. Corp. v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)
(stating how estoppel principles are applied in arbitration cases); see also supra note 238
(gathering estoppel cases).
297 See, e.g., Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776-80
(2nd Cir. 1995) (testing the enforceability of an arbitration agreement against a nonsignatory on these grounds, and emphasizing that estoppel generally applies only to bind
signatories because they have agreed to arbitrate with someone).
298 Marcinko v. Palm Harbor Homes, Inc., No. 01CA677, 2002 WL 1438658, at *35 (Ohio Ct. App. June 21, 2002).
299 id. at *5.
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3° °
the MH purchase agreement incorporated, the arbitration provision.
Accordingly, the purchase agreement promises would have provided
30 1
adequate consideration for the arbitration provision.
. The judicial trend favors enforcing these form arbitration agreements in
MH consumer contracts. 302 Many courts uphold one-sided form provisions,
such as Conseco's discussed above, and seem to treat these provisions as
accepted MH practice. 30 3 Still, insiders cannot rely on this trend because
courts' applications of contract defenses remain uncertain. 304 In the end, no
one is content.

V. POSSIBLE HUD ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ARBITRATION OF MH
CONSUMER CLAIMS

Consumers struggle to obtain remedies for MH defects due to onerous
arbitration provisions and MH insiders' blame game avoidance strategy. In
300 Id. at *3-4.
301 See, e.g., DRAHOZAL, supra note 219, at 103-06 (discussing the lack of
consideration defense to arbitration agreements).
302 Id.; see also Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Wilder, 47 S.W.3d 335, 341-44
(Ky. Ct. App. 2001) (denying consumers' claim that arbitration agreement in MH sales
and financing contract was unconscionable where the lender's form allowed lender to
litigate collection and foreclosure suits, and presented arbitration costs that arguably
would hinder consumers' vindication of Consumer Protection Act rights); In re Firstmerit
Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 756-58 (Tex. 2001) (denying claims by MH buyers and
donees that arbitration agreement in MH financing contract was unconscionable where
the agreement permitted the lender to seek judicial relief to enforce its security interest
and required consumer filing fees of at least $2,000, $250/day/party hearing fee, and
other arbitrator and hearing fees).
303 See supra notes 6, 135, 146 and accompanying text (discussing Conseco or
Green Tree Financing form arbitration clause included in many MH contracts); see also
Wilder, 47 S.W.3d at 342-43 (emphasizing that courts have accepted the Conseco or
Green Tree Financing form and almost uniformly reject challenges to the clause). Indeed,
these form provisions become a sort of private law.
304 See Anderson v. Ashby, 873 So. 2d 168, 184 (Ala. 2003) (per curiam) (finding
arbitration clause in note and security agreement unconscionable, albeit in conjunction
with credit-life insurance transaction and not MH case); Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700
N.E.2d 859, 866-67 (Ohio 1998) (holding arbitration provision in home equity contract
unconscionable where provision in form contract permitted lender to litigate foreclosure
and collection actions, and required its targeted low-income consumers to prepay
substantial fees as a condition precedent to arbitration); Arnold v. United Cos. Lending
Corp., 511 S.E.2d 854, 859-62 (W. Va. 1998) (holding arbitration provision in consumer
loan contract unconscionable where form provision allowed lender to seek foreclosure
and collection actions in court).
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2000, the MHIA directed HUD to develop a program for improving MH
consumers' access to remedies. HUD is currently gathering input regarding
how the program should be structured, policed, and financed, who should be
permitted to lodge complaints and participate, what type of claims should be
subject to the program, and what involvement HUD should have in
facilitating the program. 30 5 HUD questions what type of dispute resolution
process it should employ, whether that process should be final, what
evidentiary and procedural rules should apply, who should serve as
decisionmakers, how those decisionmakers should be chosen and trained, and
what authority they should have in ordering corrective action. 30 6 In the
absence of clear Congressional direction, it also is unclear whether
mandatory enforcement of arbitration clauses under the FAA would trump
HUD's program.
Nonetheless, it is time for policymakers to act with respect to MH
dispute resolution. This may be under the MHIA or pursuant to additional
Congressional direction. Some ideas include: (1) Do nothing and maintain
the status quo; (2) enact federal law barring enforcement of all pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate MH warranty disputes; (3) create a federal- or statecontrolled mandatory dispute resolution program that MH consumers must
pursue prior to litigation; or (4) establish federal- or state-regulated fairness
rules for any contractual arbitration of MH warranty disputes. This Article
presents some positive and negative aspects of these options. The Article
does not fully explore all relevant aspects, but seeks to at least spark
discussion and development of a MH dispute resolution program. At a
minimum, any program should address the blame game among insiders that
gave rise to the MHIA. 307 The program also should provide fair and efficient
procedures that protect MH industry cost-savings while promoting
consumers' warranty rights. With this in mind, this Article proposes
mandatory minimum fairness standards for contractual arbitration of MH
disputes. Ideas with respect to such standards are set forth in Part VI.

305 See HUD Notice, supra note 16, at 11,453-54 (asking also what time limits
should be imposed, whether there should be an appellate process, and what corrective
actions should be required).
306 Id. at 11,452-54. HUD's notice came nearly 27 months after Congress enacted
the MHIA. Indeed, it is entirely unclear what HUD will do by 2005, and no public
comments had been published as of the time of this Article's completion.
307 Supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the MHIA's quest to cure this
blame game).
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A. Do Nothing
There are legitimate reasons to do nothing with respect to MH arbitration
contracts. The MHIA currently calls on HUD to oversee the states'
development of programs aimed to resolve disputes among MH
manufacturers, dealers, and installers regarding responsibility for repair of
defects reported within one year of a MH's installation. 308 The MHIA does
not expressly empower HUD to regulate private arbitration agreements.
Accordingly, it seems that such regulation would conflict with the FAA's
mandate that courts enforce arbitration agreements according to their
terms. 309 The current MHIA, therefore, does not affect MH insiders' mass
3 10
use of arbitration clauses.
Recent HUD actions also indicate its reluctance to regulate private
contracts. On July 25, 2003, HUD rejected a proposal by the Manufactured
Housing Consensus Committee (MHCC) to broaden HUD's rules for
governing MH insiders' handling of consumer disputes and remedial
actions. 3 11 Federal policymakers established the MHCC under the MHCSSA
to recommend MH safety and construction standards, as well as procedures
for their enforcement. 3 12 HUD rejected MHCC's recent proposal, however,
to prevent expansion of HUD's and MH insiders' responsibility with respect
to remediation of MH defects. 3 13 HUD feared the proposal's defect notice
and remediation requirements would "interfere in matters that are
traditionally settled through private contracts. ' 31 4 HUD further opined that
308 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing the MHIA).
309 See supra notes 135, 140-41, 195 and accompanying text (discussing FAA
preemption).
310 See supra notes 134, 137-38 and accompanying text (discussing the prevalence
of arbitration clauses that benefit manufacturers and lenders).
311 Manufactured Housing Consensus Committee-Rejection of Consumer
Complaint Handling Proposal; Correction, 68 Fed. Reg. 47,881, 47,881 (proposed Aug.
12, 2003) (correcting previously published incomplete form of 24 C.F.R. pt. 3282 by
restating July 25, 2003 rejection) [hereinafter Rejection].
3121Id.

313 Id. HUD emphasized that the proposal was "inconsistent with the authority
granted to the MHCC," and imposed duties on parties who Congress did not intend to
reach, such as "retailers, distributors, transporters, and landscapers." Id.
314 Id. at 47,882. MHCC's proposal would not have limited consumers' rights under
contract and other law. Id. However, it required State Administrative Agencies (SAA) to
forward complaints regarding serious MH defects to responsible parties, monitor
correction of these defects with respect to "design, construction, assembly, modification,
addition, or alteration of, or to, [MHs]," and ensure that these corrections are made within
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the MHIA directed establishment of a dispute resolution program in lieu of
creating statutory MH warranties. 315 Nonetheless, HUD's creation of
arbitration fairness regulations would comport with HUD's preference for
programs that impose limited administrative burdens on government
3 16
agencies.
That said, contractual liberty and efficiency generally frown on
paternalistic intervention in private transactions. 3 17 Even seemingly proconsumer regulations sometimes prove harmful to the public by suppressing
competition, causing prices to increase, and/or causing product quality to
decrease. 3 18 Legislative regulation of MH dispute resolution may hinder
efficiencies leading to cost-savings, which make MHs a viable housing
option for low-income families. 3 19 Furthermore, contract defenses, such as
unconscionability and fraud, theoretically protect consumers from
particularly arduous arbitration provisions. Arbitration on fair terms often is a
more viable avenue than litigation for consumers to obtain warranty
320
remedies.
strict time limits. Id. at 47,884. The proposal also would have required responsible parties
to reimburse MH owners for their corrections of MH defects, or to replace or refund the
purchase price of defective MHs under certain circumstances. Id.
315 Id. at 47,882. HUD also concluded, without explanation, that the proposal was
"not in agreement with [MHIA's dispute resolution process] because the proposal: adds
potentially responsible parties (e.g., landscapers, contractors, product suppliers); creates
time limits that are inconsistent with section 623; and fails to provide for a forum in
which the disputes are to be resolved." Id.
316 Id. at 47,881-82 (indicating HUD's objection to the proposal's requirement that
HUD and SAAs act as "initial arbiters" in forwarding consumer complaints to
responsible parties and ensuring corrections of MH defects because it would add to
public administrative burdens).
317 See supra note 187 (discussing the efficiency benefits of properly exercised
contractual liberty).
318 See, e.g., David H. Smith, Consumer Protection or Veiled Protectionism? An
Overview of Recent Challenges to State Restrictions on E-Commerce, 15 LoY.
CONSUMER L. REv. 359, 361-75 (2003) (discussing various state regulations of on-line
consumer sales and proposing that although these regulations appear to protect
consumers, they result in "harmful lack of competition" that "clearly outweighs the
perceived benefits of such legislation").
319 See, e.g., id. at 359-60.
320 See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & Matt Ballard, Affordable Justice Through
Arbitration:A Critique of Public Citizen's Jeremaiadon the "Costs of Arbitration,' DiSP.
RESOL. J., Nov. 2002-Jan. 2003, at 8, 10-14 (proposing that arbitration per se does not
deprive employees and consumers of opportunity to vindicate their claims, but instead
"may well be the only forum in which they can obtain a hearing"); Scott E. Mollen,
Alternate Dispute Resolution of Condominium and Cooperative Conflicts, 73 ST. JOHN'S
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The problem remains that contract defenses have neither effectively nor
efficiently policed the fairness of arbitration agreements. MH consumers
generally lack power to prevent insiders' imposition of arbitration provisions
that defy common notions of fairness. 32 1 Courts do not consistently apply
contract defenses to ensure the consensual nature or fairness of MH and other
consumer arbitration provisions. Furthermore, rampant challenges of MH
arbitration provisions, and consequent uncertainties regarding enforcement of
these provisions, diminish the efficiency benefits that insiders and consumers
arguably gain from arbitration programs. 322 This is especially true in states
such as Alabama where courts are particularly embattled regarding MH
323
arbitration.
In addition, MH consumer transactions involve a unique confluence of
factors apart from the usual consumer considerations. 324 MHs seem like
realty, but the law treats them like personalty. The law also fails to recognize
the socio-economic, political, and transactional burdens on MH
consumers. 325 Arbitration of MH warranty disputes augments these
disadvantages when insiders impose anti-consumer procedures. The
challenge is to determine what arbitration procedures are fair for resolution
of these MH disputes. Furthermore, policymakers must determine who
should be responsible for establishing and enforcing any fairness rules, and
how responsible parties should accomplish these tasks.

L. REV. 75, 86-91 (1999) (discussing the inadequacies of the judicial system for
resolving co-op and condominium housing disputes). But see Christopher R. Drahozal,
"Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 695, 720 & n.195, 721 (providing
empirical evidence regarding arbitration clauses in franchise agreements but noting the
limited empirical studies of "the use and nature of arbitration clauses" in other contexts).
321 Reasonable people certainly can disagree regarding what is "fair." It seems,
however, that MH form arbitration provisions that include a full arsenal of pro-insider
provisions are particularly onerous for consumers. See supra Part III.A (discussing
insiders' form arbitration provisions that allow only insiders to choose arbitrators and
seek remedies in court, and deny consumers' rights to class relief and attorney fees).
322 See supra Part IV (discussing the influx of consumer challenges to arbitration
and the contradictory and confusing opinions that have resulted from these challenges).
323 Garrett S. Taylor, Note, Read the Fine Print-Alabama Supreme Court Rules
that Binding Arbitration Provisions in Written Warranties are Okay, 2001 J. DISP.
RESOL. 165, 172-75 (discussing Alabama courts' flip-flop on the enforceability of
binding arbitration of MMWA claims).
324 See supra Part H (discussing factors affecting MH consumer sales).
325 Wilden, supra note 111, at 526 (noting the need for "[u]pgrading the regulatory
system" to help MHs reach their full potential, and lamenting how HUD's current
regulatory scheme "is seriously deficient in providing consumer protection").
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B. Legislative Ban on MH ArbitrationAgreements
Assuming policymakers decide to regulate MH dispute resolution, what
type of regulation is appropriate? Such regulation should protect consumers'
access to warranty remedies and procedural justice. A particularly proactive
option would be for Congress to ban pre-dispute arbitration clauses in MH
consumer contracts. Some in Congress have proposed legislation barring
such clauses in all consumer transactions. 326 Opponents of consumer
arbitration argue pre-dispute arbitration clauses unduly harm consumers'
access to fair dispute resolution and vindication of warranty rights. 327 Indeed,
this may be true with respect to arbitration provisions MH insiders bury in
form agreements and offer to consumers as a condition to purchasing a
home. 328 MH insiders may use form arbitration provisions to the
disadvantage of consumers, especially when these consumers lack counsel
329
and educational resources available to conventional homebuyers.
Policymakers, therefore, may wish to bar compulsory arbitration of MH
warranty claims to protect consumers from unwittingly forfeiting their access
330
to defect remedies.
Nonetheless, standard form contracts can promote efficiency.
Companies' use of form agreements for regularly occurring transactions may
substantially reduce their costs. 33 1 Consumers benefit when companies pass
326 See, e.g., Consumer Credit Fair Dispute Resolution Act of 2001, S. 192, 197th
Cong. § 2 (2001) (unsuccessful bill that sought to bar enforcement of pre-dispute
agreements to arbitrate consumer credit claims); Justin Kelly, Feingold Bill Would Bar
Pre-Dispute Arbitration in
Employment
Claims, Jan.
31,
2001,
at
http://www.ADRWorld.com (last visited Oct. 4, 2004) (discussing bill invalidating predispute arbitration agreements covering certain employment discrimination claims); see
also 15 U.S.C. § 1226 (2000) (limiting enforcement of agreements to arbitrate motor
vehicle franchise disputes to post-dispute written contracts, and requiring written
explanations for any arbitration awards).
327 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 2, at 462-67 (suggesting that only disputes between
parties with similar negotiating incentives should be subject to arbitration).
328 See supra Part Ill.A (discussing one-sided arbitration provisions).
329 See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of MH
buying education).
330 See supra Part II.A.2 (emphasizing the policy protecting MH safety); see also
Barnes v. McKellar, 644 A.2d 770, 772-73 (Pa. 1994) (holding an arbitration award on a
real estate vendor's claims was void under a Pennsylvania statute barring compulsory
arbitration involving title to real property).
331 See Morant, supra note 191, at 262-65 ("Because the form includes most, if not
all, of the terms and conditions for the bargain, use of the form substantially reduces
transactional costs associated with contract formation.").
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these savings on through lower prices and interest rates, or other consumer
benefits. 332 Although it is questionable whether consumers in fact enjoy
these cost savings, it may go too far to ban all pre-dispute arbitration clauses
in MH contracts.' 333 Arbitration may benefit consumers who cannot afford
litigation, and therefore would likely have no opportunity to air their
concerns in court. 334 Consumers also may be more successful on typical
claims in arbitration than in court. 335 Accordingly, policymakers must
336
approach regulation of arbitration agreements carefully.
On balance, the best option for protecting MH consumers' warranty
337
remedies likely is not complete prohibition of MH arbitration agreements.
In addition, a ban limited to pre-dispute agreements would effectively abolish
MH arbitration because MH manufacturers and lenders rarely would agree to
arbitrate after disputes arise. 338 Most companies include pre-dispute
332 Ware, supra note 143, at 211-13 (suggesting how companies pass dispute
resolution cost savings on to consumers). But see Stemlight, supra note 142, at 686-93
(questioning whether consumers benefit from companies' dispute resolution cost
savings).
333 Sternlight, supra note 142, at 686-93; see also Morant, supra note 191, at 26267 (discussing the use of standard agreements to prejudice weaker bargaining parties).
334 See Theodore 0. Rogers, Jr., The ProceduralDifferences Between Litigation in
Court and Arbitration: Who Benefits?, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 633, 640-41
(2001) (comparing the costs and benefits of arbitration and litigation in employment
cases, and concluding there are "real advantages for employees in the arbitration process"
and employers may opt for arbitration because it offers more certainty).
335 See Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitrationand Civil Rights,
COLUM.
HuM. RTs. L. REV. 29, 46 (1998) (finding that,. on the whole, employees did
30
better in arbitration than in litigation on their claims against employers).
336 See Morant, supra note 191, at 256-61 (noting the pitfalls and limitations of
"paternalistic intervention" if employed by courts and legislators in contract
enforcement).
337 See Drahozal & Hylton, supra note 168, at 582 (warning that laws making
arbitration "less attractive" may "not only raise the costs of dispute resolution, but they
also reduce the governance benefits associated with a contract" such as "quality of
output" and "level of effort").
338 See Lewis L. Maltby, Out of the Frying Pan, Into the Fire: The Feasibility of
Post-Dispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 313, 31430 (2003) (finding in a recent study of employment arbitration that legislation barring
pre-dispute arbitration agreements would prevent employment disputes from ever being
arbitrated and would deny most employees the opportunity to pursue claims against
employers due to high incidence of summary judgment, lack of access to representation
in small dollar claims, and high costs and delays of litigation). Interestingly, aversion to
post-dispute arbitration agreements arises not only in uneven bargaining contexts, but
also in business to business disputes. Professor Maltby found in a study of all 2001
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arbitration clauses in form agreements to avoid the risks of a few highcost/bad-publicity cases in which consumers likely would reject post-dispute
arbitration agreements. 339 MH companies generally are not eager to arbitrate,
however, after they become vested in their positions on the merits of a
case. 340 Moreover, these companies generally prefer to litigate claims they
can quickly squelch through summary judgment.
Ideally, contract law would adequately protect MH consumers from
unjust arbitration provisions. 34 1 Courts' current application of contract
defenses, however, has not done the job.342 Nonetheless, it seems an all-ornothing approach is not the answer. We cannot afford to do nothing in light
of current threats to MH safety and inefficient uncertainty of MH arbitration
enforcement. We should also not hastily ban all pre-dispute arbitration
343
agreements to the detriment of procedural and product cost-savings.
C. Mandatory Federalor State Dispute Resolution Programas a
Preconditionto MH Litigation
The MHIA or other federal law could delegate the power to HUD or the
FTC to establish and implement a dispute resolution program as a
precondition to filing MH warranty claims in court. It currently appears that
HUD will focus the MHIA program on intra-industry disputes among

business dispute cases filed by the AAA's Somerville, New Jersey office, that postdispute agreements were used in only 7 of the 78 cases (9%). Id. at 322.
339 See id. at 314-21 (explaining that, in the employment context, corporate counsel
are generally risk averse, and are more likely to agree to pre-dispute arbitration because
they do not know the extent of any liability they may face in a few future disputes;
explaining further that once the facts of a dispute are known, there is much less incentive
to agree to arbitration, especially when many, if not most, cases can be squelched through
summary judgment on weak claims, or low-dollar settlements with employees who
cannot fund litigation).
340 Id. at 323-28 (indicating the responses of management attorneys regarding
companies' reluctance to arbitrate after they see the risk and possibility of summary
judgment in a case).
341 See id. at 329-30 (explaining that the central enforcement question should be
whether the parties have consented to an agreement).
342 See supra Part LV.B (discussing the application of contract defenses in MH
contexts).
343 See Maltby, supra note 338, at 330 (concluding that barring pre-dispute
arbitration agreements in employment cases "will not solve the problem," but "would
leave the majority of employees who need arbitration in order to obtain justice empty
handed").
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insiders. 344 It is unclear, however, whether HUD will require participation in
a MHIA program as a pre-condition to filing suit. It is also unclear whether
345
HUD will include consumers in such a program.
At this stage, some policymakers have created informal dispute
resolution programs. For example, some states have developed various
programs for addressing state and federal MH requirements, and for
forwarding consumer complaints to responsible manufacturers. 34 6 The MHIA
also has sparked some states to create more formal dispute resolution
programs. The Alabama Manufactured Housing Commission (AMHC) is
developing a state MHIA mechanism for resolving warranty disputes among
347
MH manufacturers, retailers, and installers.
Statutorily prescribed mandatory arbitration schemes generally are
constitutional and enforceable where they allow for some judicial review,
and therefore comport with any right to a jury trial with respect to legal
remedies. 34 8 With proper authorization, HUD or the FTC could establish a
dispute resolution program that consumers must pursue before filing suit or
seeking other means for redressing warranty claims. In- this way, a
government agency could require all parties involved in a warranty dispute to
participate in mediation, arbitration, or some other form of alternative dispute
resolution (ADR). In order to have "teeth," such a program would have to be
mandatory. In other words, such a program would trump MH insiders'
attempts to require that consumers waive access to the program.
Such a mandatory ADR program likely would provide consumers with a
means for asserting their warranty claims. Perhaps the program could allow
344 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (discussing the MHIA).
345 See supra note 46 (discussing HUD's focus).
346 A representative from HUD's Office of Manufactured Housing Program reported
that there are 38 states that have agencies assisting consumers with MH complaints. Email from Elsie Draughan, Office of Manufactured Housing Programs, to Emily Lauck,
Research Assistant to Associate Professor Amy Schmitz, University of Colorado School
of Law (Oct. 14, 2003) (on file with author).
347 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 535-X-18-.04-.07 (2003), pursuant to ALA. CODE § 24-6-4
(1975). Per the regulation, the AMHC determines who is responsible for defects based on
"credible source[s]," and orders responsible parties to correct defects within a specified
period, "normally twenty (20) days after receipt." ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 535-X-18-.04.07 (2003). In addition, the regulation requires the MH owner be contacted to verify
repairs have been completed, and allows for a hearing or on-site inspection requested by
any affected party within ten days after an adverse notice. Id.
348 See Motor Vehicle Mfr. Ass'n of the U.S., Inc. v. New York, 550 N.E.2d 919,
923-26 (N.Y. 1990) (upholding the statutory mandatory arbitration of warranty claims
where parties may seek judicial review of any arbitration award to ensure it is supported
by adequate evidence).
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consumers to assert defect claims before losing their homes in foreclosure
actions. A public agency also could craft procedural rules for the ADR
program to preserve fair processes for consumers to address warranty
disputes. 349 A program of this nature also may provide more public
350
disclosure than private arbitration regarding insiders' MMWA violations.
Although an administrative program would stymie judicial rulemaking, it
would shed public light on warranty abuses by MH insiders. The degree of
publicity, however, would depend on whether the program was confidential
or open to the public.
HUD or another federal body could administer the ADR program on a
national level. If HUD chose to do so, it would be responsible for
establishing program procedures, generating lists of qualified neutrals, and
essentially handling a full range of complex administrative details that bodies
such as the AAA handle with the aid of considerable financial and human
resources. This would be an impossible administrative burden for HUD to
shoulder with its current staff and funding. 35 1 Moreover, it is doubtful that
Congress would equip HUD with the resources needed to create the
administrative regime necessary for such an ADR program. Congress
established HUD "as a program, not a regulatory agency." 352 Some assert
that HUD has been unable to even regulate and update the MH code it
353
created under the MHCSSA.
Accordingly, it appears that states would be in a better position than
HUD to administer any MH ADR program. Indeed, the MHIA envisions
decentralized dispute resolution programs, and state administration of the
programs would help alleviate HUD's burdens. Allowing states to administer
their own programs in accordance with HUD's guidelines would decrease
administrative layers and lessen the drain on federal resources. In addition,
state programs could encompass MH installers outside of HUD's regulation
and improve accountability for remediation of MH defects. 3 54 States also
could tailor programs to their local MH demographics and experiences. This
349 See supra Part III.A (discussing insider-imposed arbitration provisions).
350 See supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text (discussing concerns regarding
vindication of statutory rights under MMWA).
351 Wilden, supra note 111, at 530-31.
352 Id.

353 Id. at 526-31 (emphasizing how HUD has been unable to regulate the MH code,
and how that code has failed to protect consumers); see also supra notes 40-43 and
accompanying text (discussing HUD's creation of loose federal MH standards).
354 See Wilden, supra note 111, at 530-31 (discussing lack of accountability due to
HUD's administration of the MH code at the federal level).
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would foster federalism and comport with many policymakers' preference
for preserving state control over public safety and welfare programs. 3 55 It
also would place administrative burdens on states in accordance with their
shares of MH warranty disputes. For example, Alabama would have the
opportunity to craft a program to address its significant MH warranty issues,
but also would shoulder the burden of administering the program.
HUD or another federal body nonetheless would have the hefty tasks of
creating mandatory ADR program guidelines and policing states' compliance
with those guidelines. Moreover, states likely would clamor for federal
funding to fuel their hands-on administration of these programs. It is doubtful
legislators on the federal or state level would eagerly shoulder these financial
and administrative burdens. A process of funding "hot-potato" most likely
would lead to high costs for participants in these programs. This, in turn,
leads to questions regarding consumers' responsibility for ADR fees and
costs. 3 56 Concerns also remain regarding states' vulnerabilities to local
insiders' political might. 357 Variations among state programs also may invite
forum-shopping by national manufacturers and lenders to the detriment of
consumers.
D. Mandatory Federal or State FairnessRules for Contractual
Arbitration of MH Warranty Disputes
It seems government-run ADR programs for MH consumer warranty
disputes would not be politically or practically feasible at this time.
Accordingly, it may be more feasible for policymakers to encourage MH
358
consumers' use of improved private arbitration to seek warranty remedies.
HUD or other policymakers could seek to improve the fairness of MH

355 Id. at 536 (questioning the survival of HUD, and emphasizing functional and
political reasons for transferring responsibility for MH programs to states).
356 See supra notes 155-60 and accompanying text (discussing Randolph's failure to
clarify what qualifies arbitration costs as so high that they preclude consumers from
vindicating statutory rights); see also infra Part VI (discussing possible standards for
regulation of costs in private arbitrations).
357 See Smith, supra note 318, at 374-75 (discussing how companies with political
clout have influenced seemingly pro-consumer regulations of on-line transactions in
certain areas, such as liquor sales).
358 See generally Maltby, supra note 338, at 330. As Professor Maltby concluded
with respect to employment arbitration, "Rather than change from one unacceptable
option to another, models for voluntary pre-dispute arbitration agreements need to be
further developed." Id.
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arbitrations by dictating minimum standards for such processes. 359 This is
not an entirely novel idea-others have proposed due process standards for
360 Due to the
binding arbitration of employment and consumer disputes.
statutory policies and uneven bargaining contexts involved, organizations
administering ADR have promulgated consensus standards for binding
arbitration of these disputes. 36 1 In Congress, Senator Jeff Sessions introduced
and employment arbitrations at the end of the
such legislation for consumer
36 2
session.
2000 legislative
Legislating arbitration fairness standards invokes classic struggles
between contractual liberty and procedural fairness. Parties should be free to
negotiate arbitration contracts that fit their needs, but equities may dictate
limits on that freedom. Accordingly, policymakers should regulate only those
standardized form contracts MH insiders offer to consumers without
negotiation. 36 3 Furthermore, they should investigate what arbitration
procedures are "fair" before crafting standards that impinge contractual
liberty. 364 Standards should respond to the unique relational, contextual, and
359 See id. (proposing regulation of pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a middle
road for ensuring fairness of employment arbitration).
360 See, e.g., Budnitz, supra note 148, at 333-43 (proposing minimum standards for
arbitration of consumer claims against financial institutions); Maltby, supra note 338, at
328-30 (discussing ways to increase fairness of employment arbitration agreements);
Robert Alexander Schwartz, Can Arbitration Do More for Consumers? The TILA Class
Action Reconsidered, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 809, 833-43 (2003) (proposing regulations of
consumer arbitration agreements aimed to provide consumers with a "cheap or free"
arbitral forum and to protect "the prospect of a fair, impartial decision").
361 See AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 155; National Consumer Disputes
Advisory Committee, Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Consumer
Disputes (1998), at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/petl0608.htm [hereinafter Consumer
Protocol]; Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Health Care Disputes
(1998), at http://www.ama-assn.org/amal/pub/upload/mm/395/healthcare.pdf.
362 Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong. § 2(c)
(2000) (bill to establish due process standards for consumer and employment arbitration).
363 See, e.g., id. § 17(a) (proposing fairness standards applicable only to
"standardized form contract[s] between the parties to a consumer transaction").
364 See Robert G. Bone, Agreeing to FairProcess: The Problem with Contractarian
Theories of Procedural Fairness, 83 B.U. L. REV. 485, 493-94 (2003) (critiquing
common approaches for analyzing procedural fairness, and proposing "that a convincing
fairness analysis requires more than the simple ex ante argument and more than the sort
of pragmatic value-balancing or crude appeal to intuition that is all too common today").
I admit that this Article's proposal calls on a fair amount of pragmatic value-balancing
and more research certainly is necessary to develop fairness standards. This Article,
however, seeks to spark awareness of dispute resolution concerns in the unique MH
microcosm.
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policy factors involved in MH warranty dispute resolution. They should seek
both to ensure a level of protection for MH consumers' warranty claims and
to clarify for all contracting parties which arbitration provisions are
enforceable in MH contracts.
Clarification of adequate procedures could save both insiders and
consumers the time and resources they currently devote to litigating these
issues. Insiders could better rely on the enforceability of arbitration programs
that comply with prescribed standards. This may encourage them to pass
related savings on to consumers through improved products and lower prices
or interest rates. Consumers would be on notice of the likely futility of
attacks on arbitration agreements that comply with the minimum standards.
Likewise, all parties would know that agreements failing to meet these
standards would be invalid.
Congress could delegate authority to create such arbitration standards
either to HUD to preserve the safety and affordability of MHs or to the FTC
to protect warranty rights under the MMWA. Congress would have to make
any such delegation of authority explicit, however, in order to override the
FAA's general arbitration enforcement regime. 365 It seems such standards
would further federal policies, as well as the Supreme Court's declaration
that contracts are subject to the power of the state to protect public policy,
including the promotion of safe housing. 366 In addition, the standards would
merely set a floor, allowing parties to contract for procedures that are more
protective of consumer claims.
VI. SUGGESTED MINIMUM FAIRNESS STANDARDS FOR THE
ARBITRATION OF MH CONSUMER CLAIMS

Any legislated arbitration standards should apply only to non-negotiable
MH agreements, and should not overly impede efficiency or contractual
liberty. Policymakers, MH insiders, and consumers should debate the precise
contours of any mandatory minimum fairness standards for MH arbitration
agreements. This Article suggests some guidelines, and invites all involved
to explore these and other ideas in order to create standards for efficient and
procedurally fair MH arbitrations. Of course, there are positive and negative
365 See supra notes 203-14 and accompanying text (discussing the courts' struggles
with whether the MMWA clearly overrides the FAA and precludes binding arbitration).
366 See Marcus Brown Holding Co., Inc. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 197-98 (1921)
(holding law requiring reasonable rents and limiting landlords' rights to maintain actions
to recover possession of rented housing was justified in light of a policy protecting
shelter, and therefore did not improperly impair landlords' contract rights).
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aspects to each suggested standard, and no set of standards will be a panacea.
is important both
However, discussion of these positive and negative aspects
367
in MH cases and in other uneven bargaining contexts.
A. State-TailoredStandardsAimed at Local Concerns
1. ProtectionsResponsive to State Concerns
One option is for HUD to dictate broad goals or requirements for the
regulation of MH arbitration agreements, but require states to determine and
implement their own precise standards. State policymakers are better suited
than HUD regulators to determine dispute resolution standards that comport
with local MH concerns and demographics. For example, policymakers in
Florida and Arizona may wish to craft rules applicable to their divergent MH
communities. They could devise regulations that account for differences
between purchases of high-end MHs used as vacation getaways and
purchases of lower-end MHs which consumers rely on as their only
368
shelters.
HUD's broad guidelines could allow states with particularly rampant
MH warranty problems to require stricter standards. In addition, some states
simply have more MHs, more MH consumer sales, and more consumer
challenges of MH arbitration agreements. For example, Alabama may wish
to provide more specific standards for MH dispute resolution in order to
369
quell its current flood of MH warranty litigation.

367 Such legislative fairness standards have been introduced in Congress, but they
have sparked little debate or action. See supra note 362 (noting the bill referred to the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary in 2000).
368 Regardless of minimum standards, contract law still would apply. These
standards, however, would ease uncertainties and prevent the need to litigate issues like
unconscionability. See Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1318 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1986) (denying unconscionability challenge of arbitration contract where
challengers failed to show it was a take-it-or-leave-it contract), superseded by statute as
stated in Villa Milano Homeowners Ass'n v. I1. Davorge, 84 Cal. App. 4th 819, 830 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000) (applying new state statute permitting purchaser to bring construction
claims in court despite an arbitration clause in a real estate purchase agreement, but not

affecting unconscionability analysis in Izzi).
369 See supra note 323 (referencing haphazard MH challenges in Alabama).
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2. HUD Oversight of Minimal Uniformity
States may not go too far in restricting the enforceability of arbitration
agreements. The FAA preempts state regulations that overly restrict the
enforceability of arbitration beyond Congress's delegations to HUD and the
FTC. That said, Congress could authorize HUD or the FTC to gather
interested parties and develop uniform standards pursuant to their research
and input. Federal direction of standards would prevent forum-shopping and
jurisdictional battles that could result from divergent state standards.
Regardless of whether federal or state policymakers create arbitration
standards, states should implement and enforce the standards. A federal
agency should not shoulder the administrative burden of policing these
contracts. Enforcement of these contract regulations, however, would not be
as burdensome as administering ADR programs. Courts would enforce the
regulations by invalidating agreements that violate them. In addition, parties
would retain rights to raise contract challenges to invalidate agreements that
pass minimum standards. The standards would promote certainty and
reliance on compliant arbitration provisions, however, by limiting successful
challenges and courts' varied and ambiguous applications of contract
defenses to MH arbitration agreements.
B. ProceduresGeared To Promote Efficient Arbitration and Contain
Delays and Costs
Regulations of arbitration agreements should not drive insiders to end
their consumer arbitration programs. Although some consumers always
prefer litigation over arbitration, others would mourn the loss of an
arbitration option. Companies' elimination of their arbitration programs also
could drive increases in consumer prices and decreases in product quality.
Accordingly, any regulations should balance consumers' and insiders'
concerns.
1. Finality Coupled with Time Limits to Promote Efficiency
Final and time-limited arbitration of MH disputes would benefit insiders,
consumers, and courts. Any MH arbitration standards, therefore, should set
reasonable time limits on arbitration proceedings and ensure their finality.
These time limits should not impede parties' opportunities to present their
cases. However, parties should not be able to use delays and postponements
to harass opponents and frustrate arbitration's efficiency.
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Currently, FAA arbitration awards are final and subject to very limited
judicial review focused on ensuring minimal procedural fairness. 370 Courts
could apply this same FAA limited review to MH arbitration awards. As an
alternative, federal law could prescribe slightly broader review by allowing
courts to review awards for legal errors. The Supreme Court condoned
arbitration of statutory claims on the assumption that judicial review of
awards would be sufficient to ensure arbitrators' proper application of these
statutes. 37 1 In reality, however, courts' limited and deferential review of
awards under the FAA often defies this assumption. 372 Review of legal error
may help cure this disjoint to ensure that arbitrators properly apply MH
safety and warranty laws.
Any expansion of FAA judicial review, however, comes with
uncertainties and drawbacks. It is unclear whether legal error review would
help consumers. It may saddle consumers with undue costs of preserving a
record. 373 In addition, companies may use such review to overwhelm
consumers with post-arbitration litigation, or to squelch pro-consumer
awards based more on facts and equities than strict application of legal
rules.37 4 Furthermore, there is some debate about whether expanded review
of arbitration would unduly frustrate FAA policy and the finality of
arbitration. 375 Indeed, these concerns have led to courts' current
disagreement regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements calling
for expanded judicial review.

370 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2003).
371 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991)
(consigning ADEA claims to arbitration on the assumption that employees will be able to
vindicate their ADEA rights in arbitration).
372 See Thomas J. Stipanowich, Contract and Conflict Management, 2001 Wis. L.

REV. 831, 910, 914-15 (noting that, in reality, judicial review under the FAA does not
ensure arbitrators comply with statutes).
373 See Lapine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp., Nos. C-87-20316 WAI, C-9120159 WAI, 2000 WL 765556, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2000) (evidencing burdens of
review on courts and parties due to added litigation and need for the requisite arbitration
record).
374 See, e.g., Harris v. Parker Coll. of Chiropractic, 286 F.3d 790, 794 (5th Cir.
2002) (enforcing an expanded review agreement at the insistence of an employer
challenging an arbitration award in favor of an employee on her hostile work
environment and retaliation claims); Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925, 93336 (10th Cir. 2001) (involving Amoco's attempt to enforce an expanded review
agreement to challenge an arbitration award for the landowners).
375 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 936 (holding an expanded review provision
unenforceable under the FAA).
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2. Liberal Joinderto Aid Efficiency and End the Blame Game
MH arbitration standards should allow for liberal joinder of all parties
involved in selling, manufacturing, installing, and financing a defective MH.
Allowance for joinder would comport with the MHIA's goal of ending the
blame game among MH manufacturers, retailers, and installers, which has
hindered consumers' access to warranty remedies. 376 Furthermore,
arbitration agreements' hindrance of joinder breeds parallel proceedings that
burden consumers, companies, and courts.
Currently, most courts will not consolidate arbitration proceedings unless
the agreements at issue expressly permit it. 37 7 Courts reason that parties who
contractually agree to arbitrate with named parties do not necessarily consent
to arbitrate as a group in one forum. Furthermore, courts will not order third
parties to an agreement to join arbitration without their consent. Parties who
have not contracted to arbitrate generally are free to litigate unless a court
can bind them to an arbitration agreement under estoppel, agency,
incorporation, alter ego, or another theory for binding a nonsignatory to a
378
contract.
In MH cases, however, the importance of having warranty disputes
resolved in one forum justifies consolidation. It also supports joinder of third
parties with a significant stake in a MH warranty arbitration. Courts' refusal
to order consolidation or joinder frustrates the fair and efficient resolution of
MH defect claims implicating various responsible parties. Expensive and
time-consuming parallel proceedings create risks of undue liability and
frustrate courts' and arbitrators' determinations of liability issues?379 Liberal
consolidation or joinder would therefore aid consumers in holding all
responsible parties accountable for their contributions to the MH defects.
At a minimum, these concerns justify joinder of parties who have
consented to arbitrate, albeit by separate arbitration contracts. The more
difficult questions arise with respect to joining parties to arbitration who have
not agreed to arbitrate at all. In such cases, it may be appropriate to allow all
parties to resolve warranty issues in litigation. This raises questions,
376 See supra note 46 and accompanying text (discussing the MHIA's goals with

respect to dispute resolution).
377 See supra notes 161-65 and accompanying text (discussing courts' reluctance to
consolidate arbitrations).
378 See supra note 297 (noting how courts bind non-signatories to arbitration
agreements in some MH cases).
379 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing significant defects caused
by faulty installation).
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however, regarding the propriety of preventing parties' enforcement of
contract rights.
As a less aggressive alternative, the standards could allow courts to stay
litigation related to an ongoing MH warranty arbitration. This has significant
drawbacks. It stymies non-parties' access to judicial remedies and creates
significant risks that factual findings in the arbitration may bind nonarbitrating parties. In addition, this may perpetuate the blame game by
encouraging arbitrating parties to blame non-parties to the litigation and vice
versa. Nonetheless, some non-parties may join warranty arbitrations in order
to protect their positions with respect to key factual issues regarding MH
defect responsibility. Again, these are suggestions for policymakers to
consider and debate.
3. Limited and StreamlinedDiscovery and Evidentiary Rules
Aimed to FurtherEfficiency
Some commentators support broad discovery and strict application of
evidentiary rules in consumer and employment arbitrations to protect parties'
procedural rights and vindication of statutory claims. 380 Some courts also
have refused to enforce arbitration agreements in uneven bargaining contexts
due to concerns about insufficient discovery. 38 1 One court indicated, for
example, that arbitration as a condition of employment must provide for
"more than minimal discovery" in order to protect employees' vindication of
statutory rights. 382
Added discovery and evidentiary rules, however, often judicialize
arbitration by transforming it into private litigation. 383 This undermines the

380 See Budnitz, supra note 148, at 311-12 (opining that "arbitration's restrictions
on discovery may make it impossible for consumers to prepare their case" because
consumers often need documents in the corporation's control); Stemlight, supra note
142, at 683-84 (discussing how corporate defendants can decrease consumers' claims by
using arbitration to prevent consumers from getting the discovery they need, and noting
that "even a seemingly neutral restriction on discovery will affect consumers adversely").
381 See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 39 F. Supp. 2d 582, 614-15 (D.S.C.
1998) (holding arbitration clause unconscionable where the employer had control over
arbitrator selection and employee had very limited discovery), aff'd on other grounds,
173 F.3d 933, 940 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding employer breached employment agreement by
establishing biased arbitration rules).
382 Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
383 See, e.g., Ware, supra note 171, at 93-97 (discussing the judicialization of
arbitration); Kirby Behre, Arbitration:A Permissible or Desirable Method for Resolving
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efficiency benefits of arbitration. 384 Furthermore, even some scholars who
oppose arbitration of consumer disputes nonetheless recognize that
judicialization of arbitration may be particularly detrimental to consumers.385
Many consumers, more so than companies, lack the financial resources to
fund expenses of trial-like arbitration procedures. 386 In addition, even if there
are cases in which individual consumers benefit from such procedures,
judicialized arbitration may harm consumers as a whole by increasing prices
3 87
and interest rates.
Nonetheless, employees and consumers often do not have access to the
information that they need to present their cases. This is especially true for
MH consumers who lack access to information and evidence relative to the
manufacturing and installation of MHs. Accordingly, MH arbitration
388 It
standards should ensure consumers' access to necessary information.
may be wise for standards to specify that parties involved must exchange all
relevant information in good faith. The rules also could allow arbitrators to
impose stiff sanctions for any party's failure to do so. The information
exchange, however, need not be formal, and should comport with the
389
expedited nature of arbitration.

Disputes Involving Federal Acquisition and Assistance Contracts?, 16 PUB. CONT. L.J.
66, 88-89 (1986) (same).
384 See Ware, supra note 171, at 93 (emphasizing the drawbacks of judicialization of
arbitration proceedings); Behre, supra note 384, at 88 (noting that the cost savings of
arbitration "is negated if the parties to an arbitration demand judicialization").
385 Moohr, supra note 171, at 1092-98 (discussing unfairness of arbitration in
traditionally non-merchant contexts and noting how judicialization of arbitration results
in "expensive hybrid" ADR that may be too burdensome for non-commercial disputants).
386 See id. at 1093; see also Michael Heise, Justice Delayed?: An Empirical
Analysis of Civil Case Disposition Time, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 813, 843 (2000).
Generally, non-individuals, especially corporate parties, enjoy greater access than
individuals to economic resources necessary to litigate "with more vigor and for a longer
period of time." Id. A 1992 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics survey of
state courts indicated that involvement of non-individual defendants in litigation
generally resulted in longer trials. Id. at 842-44.
387 See Ware, supra note 171, at 89-93 (noting how judicialization of proceedings
often results in increased business costs that are passed on to the populace through higher
prices).
388 See Cole v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1997)
(noting the importance of sufficient discovery in employment cases).
389 Senator Sessions' proposed standards, for example, require parties to
employment and consumer arbitrations to "grant access to all information reasonably
relevant to the dispute" and allow for depositions to the extent "consistent with the
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The rules also could specify that parties may hold back only those
documents and communications protected by important policy-driven rules
such as attorney-client or other privileges. 390 Safeguards may also be
necessary to prevent revelation of embarrassing or particularly prejudicial
evidence. One idea is to require that parties specify during the exchange of
documents what they believe is protected. Arbitrators could then determine
objections prior to the arbitration proceedings to expedite hearings.
Mandatory regulations should not undermine arbitration's equity and
efficiency goals by requiring strict application of evidence rules in the
proceedings.
C. Additional Protectionsfor Consumers' Access to Warranty
Remedies
In balancing efficiency and fairness concerns, policymakers may also
consider requiring additional standards particularly geared to protecting MH
consumers' access to warranty remedies. Although these protections may be
unpopular with MH insiders, they may be appropriate in order to account for
unique factors affecting MH transactions, and to promote safe and affordable
MHs as an important source of low-income housing.3 9 1 Some arbitration
provisions that may deserve special regulation include those covering
disclosure, proceeding costs, arbitrator selection, proceeding location, class
relief, and access to remedies provided by statute. Of course, this list is by no
means exhaustive. Policymakers should consider the positive and negative
aspects of these and other provisions.
1. Disclosureof Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts
Federal arbitration law does not require special disclosure or notice of
arbitration provisions. Instead, it directs courts to enforce arbitration
agreements like any other contracts. 392 The Supreme Court held that the FAA

expedited nature of arbitration." Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S.
3210, 106th Cong. § 2(c)(5)(A), (B) (2000).
390 See id. (providing that access to information should be "subject to any applicable
privilege or other limitation on discovery").
391 See supra Part II.B (discussing various factors affecting MH transactions).
392 See Volt Info. Scis. v. Bd.of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 478-79 (1989) (stating that the
FAA's purpose is to ensure that "private arbitration agreements are enforced").
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393
preempts state law requiring special arbitration notice or disclosure.
Congress, therefore, would have to condone any special notice provisions.
Such contract regulation, however, may be appropriate in the MH
consumer context. Consumers often purchase MHs in high-pressure
transactions. 394 They often do not read, let alone understand, related
contracts. This is especially true regarding arbitration clauses with
complicated carve-outs and one-sided procedures that may negatively impact
warranty rights. In addition, MH consumers are generally not beneficiaries of
homebuyer education and counseling. 395 Accordingly, policymakers should
seriously consider notice requirements for form arbitration clauses in MH
contracts. Disclosure rules also could provide consumers with information
396
regarding MH-buying resources.

2. BalancedArbitratorSelections
Pro-insider arbitrator selection provisions in MH arbitration clauses raise
red flags for courts and policymakers. Some courts have invalidated
arbitration agreements that give companies sole power to choose
arbitrators. 3 97 Some policymakers have proposed regulations for ensuring
competence and neutrality of arbitrators, especially in light of concerns
regarding repeat-player advantages. 398 Nonetheless, many courts enforce
agreements allowing insiders to choose the arbitrator with the consumer's

393 See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1996) (holding
that the FAA preempted state law requiring special disclosure of arbitration clauses).
394 See supra Part II.B.2.b (describing a high-pressure context).
395 See supra Part II.B.2.c (discussing the lack of MH buyer education).
396 See, e.g., Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210, 106th
Cong. § 2(b) (2000) (requiring special notice of an arbitration clause in form employment
and consumer agreements, as well as identification of sources to contact for further

information).
397 See, e.g., Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 867,
874-77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding employer's dispute resolution procedure so onesided that it did not qualify as "arbitration" enforceable under the FAA); see also supra
notes 246-49 and accompanying text (discussing unconscionability arguments based on
one-sided selection).
398 See S. 3210 § 2(c)(1)(A), (B) (emphasizing that parties should have a right to "a
competent, neutral arbitrator," and an "equal voice" in arbitrator selection); see also
supra note 175 and accompanying text (discussing repeat player concerns).
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consent,399 and policymakers have not enacted regulations requiring that
40 0
consumers have an active and equal voice in choosing arbitrators.
The Consumer Due Process Protocol suggested by the National
Consumer Dispute Advisory Committee calls on arbitrators to be impartial
and to comply with fairly strict arbitrator disclosure rules. 40 1 The AAA
Consumer Rules seek to ensure that parties enjoy equal voices in choosing
arbitrators by requiring the AAA to appoint arbitrators, subject to both
parties' objections. 40 2 The proposed Consumer and Employee Arbitration
Bill of Rights requires that arbitrators and administering organizations be
competent, neutral, and independent. 40 3 These proposed rules also require
that parties have "an equal voice in the selection of the arbitrator," who must
comply with the AAA Code of Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial
Disputes. Arbitrators also must not have "personal or financial interest in the
results," or relationships to the dispute or with parties or their counsel "that
40 4
may create an appearance of bias."
MH arbitration rules could mimic these models. They could borrow
"equal voice" and "appearance of bias" standards. Although the meaning of
"equal voice" is unclear, it seems it would require that both parties actively
participate in arbitrator selection. In addition, the "appearance of bias"
standard would protect arbitrator neutrality to a greater degree than current
40 5
FAA § 10 review.

399 See, e.g., Conseco Fin. Corp. v. Boone, 838 So. 2d 370, 372-73 (Ala. 2002) (per
curiam) (enforcing Conseco's form arbitration provision although it allowed Conseco to
choose the arbitrator subject to MH consumer's consent). Even if a court finds a onesided arbitrator selection provision substantively unconscionable, it may not invalidate
the agreement if there is not sufficient showing of procedural unconscionability. Courts
vary widely with respect to both of these determinations. See supra Part IV.B.1
(discussing divergent unconscionability cases).
400 Congress has not enacted the Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights
or other such regulations that would preempt other state rules altering contractual
provisions.
401 Consumer Protocol, supra note 361, at Principle 3.
402 AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 361, at C-4.
403 S.3210 § 2(c)(1)(A).
404 Id. § 2(c)(2).

405 The current FAA allows courts to vacate awards based on "evident partiality" of
the arbitrator. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(2) (2003). This standard is not as
protective as the "appearance of bias" standard Senator Sessions suggests in this bill. See
Merit Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 714 F.2d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1983) (emphasizing that
review is very narrow under § 10 and requires parties show circumstances "powerfully
suggestive of bias" in order to warrant vacating an award).
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3. Caps on Filingand Administrative Costs
Commentators and courts voice significant concerns regarding high
40 6
The
arbitration filing fees, administration costs, and arbitrator charges.
Supreme Court has failed to clarify when large arbitration costs preclude a
consumer from effectively vindicating statutory rights.40 7 Some courts have
required those with disproportionate financial power over their opponents to
pay arbitration costs. 40 8 Courts and commentators argue this is appropriate
because arbitration filing and administration costs can be substantially higher
than such litigation costs, and high costs may chill claimants' assertion of
statutory rights. 40 9 Commentators also justify imposition of arbitration costs
on businesses by emphasizing the cost savings businesses often derive from
410
their arbitration programs.
Accordingly, mandatory rules could automatically shift responsibility for
arbitration fees and costs to companies where claimants lack financial
resources. Such rules, however, may spark frivolous claims. 4 1' Any rules
also should not assume that all consumers lack resources or have valid
claims. 4 12 They should take into account consumers' responsibility for court
406 See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 360, at 834-43 (focusing on the need for
regulations of consumer arbitration costs); see also Cole v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs., 105
F.3d 1465, 1483-86 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that the arbitrator's fees would be
"prohibitively expensive" for the employee, and subsequently requiring the employer to
pay arbitrator's fees).
407 See Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000).
408 See, e.g., Cole, 105 F.3d at 1483-86.
409 See, e.g., Scarpino, supra note 141, at 701-10 (proposing that courts require
businesses to pay arbitration costs in order to ease the financial burden of mandatory
arbitration agreements on low-income consumers).
410 See Schwartz, supra note 360, at 836-37 (emphasizing justifications for shifting
fees to companies). One of the chief benefits companies reap from arbitration provisions
is the elimination of class-action liability. Id. at 836. Nonetheless, even if class relief is
allowed in arbitration, companies still enjoy great benefits from use of standard forms,
privacy, savings on attorney fees, etc. See infra Part VI.C.6 (noting that it may be
appropriate to allow for class relief in MH consumer arbitrations in appropriate cases).
411 Schwartz, supra note 360, at 836 (noting that shifting costs to companies may
force them to settle rather than face high arbitration costs, thereby "providing a windfall
to consumers with tenuous claims and encouraging opportunistic consumers to file
frivolous claims").
412 See Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Relationship Between Employment Arbitration
and Workplace Dispute Resolution Procedures, 16 OHIO ST.J.ON DiSP. RESOL. 643, 650
(2001) (rioting that, "if the company is paying the costs of arbitration, companies may
fear that employees will make frequent use of arbitration, thereby increasing the costs of
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costs in litigation and their savings on attorneys' fees in streamlined
a more
arbitration. An important benefit of arbitration is that it often provides
4 13
affordable means than litigation for consumers to bring their claims.
Instead of mandatory cost-shifting, regulations could require arbitration
4 14
providers to develop rules that ensure "reasonable" costs for consumers.
The onus could be on the administering organization or the arbitrator to
waive, reduce, or provide for reimbursement of arbitration fees where
appropriate. 4 15 For example, an arbitrator could order a company to pay the
arbitration costs where the consumer shows need or hardship. This would
allow for flexibility to account for consumers' differing situations. It may
also be wise, however, to limit arbitrators' discretion in determining what is
"reasonable" by specifying costs to correspond with income levels. The aim
should be to provide some uniformity or clear rules on which contracting
parties may rely.
Policymakers should also consider rules preserving consumers' rights to
bring claims in small claims court. Arbitration filing costs are particularly
deleterious to small claims. Consumers often forego arbitration where costs
4 16
of filing their claims exceed any award they may obtain in the arbitration.
the procedure for the employer"). Nonetheless, rules allowing arbitrators to shift costs
back to claimants upon finding frivolity may dispel such incentive to file frivolous
claims.
413 See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward
a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1518 (1996) (proposing
that arbitration "makes the process more affordable to litigants" and "permits a much
faster resolution of the employment dispute, which will permit both the employer and the
employee to move beyond the dispute"); Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving, and
Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 779, 781 (1992) ("At the same time,
arbitration is generally affordable, efficient, flexible[,] and tailored to the needs of the
work environment.").
414 Consumer Protocol, supra note 361, at Principle 6 (stating that arbitration
providers should develop programs "which entail reasonable costs to consumers based on
the circumstances of the dispute, including, among other things, the size and nature of the
claim, the nature of the goods or services provided, and the ability of the consumer to
pay").
415 See Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong.
§ 2(c)(10) (2000).
416 See Budnitz, supra note 148, at 313 (proposing arbitration is inappropriate for
small dollar claims because such claims can be resolved for less cost in small claims
court); Richard B. Cappalli, Arbitrationof Consumer Claims: The Sad Case of Two-Time
Victim Terry Johnson or Where Have You Gone Learned Hand?, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
366, 380 (2001) (emphasizing an "arbitration clause is fatal" for consumers who "will
rarely be able to pursue their rights because of the unfavorable economics of arbitrating a
small claim").
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This is why some propose consumers should retain the right to opt out of any
arbitration agreement for claims that could be brought in small claims
court.

4 17

Policymakers could also borrow ideas from the AAA's recently revised
Supplementary Procedures for Consumer-Related Disputes.4 18 These
procedures state a fee schedule with the proviso that fees paid by consumers
are refundable if the parties settle the dispute before arbitrating.4 19 The
schedule for administrative and arbitrator fees is based on the claim amount.
For claims that do not exceed $75,000, parties pay $250 for telephonic
hearings and $750 per day of in-person hearings. 420 The rules further
provide that consumers share these arbitrator fees up to a maximum of $125
for claims under $10,000, and a maximum of $375 for claims up to
$75,000.421 The rules also limit companies' costs in order to preserve their
efficiency benefits. 4 22 They allow for flexibility by giving the AAA power to
reduce fees "in the event of extreme hardship," and preserving arbitrator
4 23
discretion to assess or apportion fees and expenses in the award.
4. Convenient ProceedingLocation
Any caps on costs are meaningless when arbitration provisions require
MH consumers to travel to inconvenient locations in order to vindicate their
warranty rights. 4 24 Some courts have held unconscionable adhesion
417 S. 3210 § 2(c)(1 1) (requiring that parties have the right to opt out of arbitration
for small claims).
418 AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 361, at C-l(d). These rules also allow parties
to bring claims to small claims court.
419 Id. at Administrative Fees.
420 Id. at C-8, ArbitratorFees.
421 Id. at C-8, Fees and Deposits to be Paid by the Consumer.
422 Id. at C-8, Fees and Deposits to be Paidby the Business.
423 AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND

MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-43 (2003) (allowing the arbitrator to "assess and apportion
the fees, expenses, and compensation related to such award as the arbitrator determines is
appropriate," and to award attorneys' fees if authorized by the parties' agreement or other
law); id. at R-49 (allowing the AAA to defer or reduce fees upon showing of hardship);
id. at R-50 (requiring the parties to bear expenses equally unless they agree otherwise or
the arbitrator assesses expenses in the award).
424 Other commentators have suggested standards requiring convenient arbitration
forums for consumers. See, e.g., Budnitz, supra note 148, at 335-36 (proposing
legislation prohibiting clauses that require arbitration in distant forums in the
consumer/lender context).
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agreements requiring consumers to arbitrate in inconvenient venues. 425 Other
courts, however, have enforced these agreements and
have held that the FAA
preempts state statutes invalidating such clauses. 426
MH consumers often lack financial resources necessary
to pay arbitration
filing costs, let alone any travel expenses required
to arbitrate in far-off
427
locales.
MH insiders, in contrast, often have offices throughout
the United
States, and the resources necessary to arbitrate in
various locations. 428
Conseco, for example, has a multitude of offices. 42 9
Nonetheless, insiders
often dictate in their form contracts that consumers must
arbitrate claims at
the insiders' headquarters.
Minimum standards for MH arbitration should ease
travel burdens on
consumers. Standards should provide that arbitration
hearings take place in
the city where the consumers reside, or another location
the parties mutually
choose after initiating arbitration. The standards could
also be more flexible.
The Consumer Protocol, for example, requires hearings
be "at a location
which is reasonably convenient to both parties" in light
of
travel and other
"pertinent circumstances." 430 A major drawback
of this approach, however,
is its failure to provide clarity. In addition, it may
augment delay and
dissention because it requires the parties' agreement
or third-party
determination regarding location after disputes arise. 43 1
Another option to explore is expanded use of telephonic
or electronic
correspondence and hearings. The AAA Consumer
Rules already allow for
"Desk Arbitration" (determined without hearings) and
"Telephonic Hearing"
(allowing parties to "tell the arbitrator about their case
during a conference
432
call"). The Consumer and Employee Arbitration
Bill of Rights proposes
425 See, e.g., Patterson v. ITT Consumer Fin. Corp.,
18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 566-67
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (refusing to order arbitration,
in part because ITT selected
arbitration rules that could require the consumer to
arbitrate in a distant forum); see also
Keystone, Inc. v. Triad Sys. Corp., 971 P.2d 1240,
1245-46 (Mont. 1998) (denying
arbitration in a distant location).
426 See, e.g., KKW Enters., Inc. v. Gloria Jean's
Gourmet Coffees Franchising
Corp., 184 F.3d 42, 50-52 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding
a provision requiring dispute

resolution in a distant forum).
427 See supra note 23 (noting the low incomes of most MH
consumers).

428 See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text
(discussing interstate character
of many MH manufacturers and lenders).

429 See Conseco, at http://www.conseco.com (indicating
major office locations).
430 Consumer Protocol, supra note 361, at Principle
7.

431 Id. (specifying that, if the parties do not agree, then a third-party
administrator
must determine the location).
432 AAA Consumer Rules, supra note 361.
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that telephonic or electronic hearings be allowed unless any party requests a
"face-to-face hearing." 4 33 This may ease burdens of travel and expense.
Elimination of in-person hearings, however, may impede amicable
settlements and deny parties the psychological benefits of facing
opponents. 434 In addition, consumers may suffer technological disadvantages
435
in electronic arbitration.
5. Access to Statutory Damages and Remedies
Companies often limit their liability and consumers' access to statutory
remedies through form contracts, regardless of whether they also require
arbitration. Courts generally enforce such limitations unless they find them
unenforceable under a common law contract defense or consumer protection
statute. 4 36 Courts should continue to judge enforceability of damage
limitation provisions under these standards.
Nonetheless, policymakers also should consider more clearly regulating
arbitration agreements that deny arbitrators' power to order punitive or
statutory damages. Such damages generally seek to punish or prevent
437
continued violations of public policies protected by statutory provisions.
433 Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong.
§ 2(c)(4)(C) (2000).
434 See Joel B. Eisen, Are We Ready for Mediation in Cyberspace?, 1998 BYU L.
REv. 1305, 1310 (1998) (noting that the "great paradox of online mediation is that it
imposes an electronic distance on the parties, while mediation is ...designed to involve
participants in direct interpersonal contact"); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, What Trina Taught
Me: Reflections on Mediation, Inequality, Teaching and Life, 81 MINN. L. REv. 1413,
1420 (1997) ("[Mlediation promises the 'venting' of feelings and the allowance of
emotions that would be inadmissible in a formal court proceeding.").
435 See Richard Birke & Louise Ellen Teitz, U.S. Mediation in 2001: The Path that
Brought America to Uniform Laws and Mediation in Cyberspace, 50 AM. J. COMP. L.
181, 211 (2002) (noting that consumers may not have sufficient access to new technology
for meaningful participation in online mediation); Lucille M. Ponte, Boosting Consumer
Confidence in E-Business: Recommendations for EstablishingFairand Effective Dispute
Resolution Programsfor B2C Online Transactions, 12 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 441, 47071 (2002) (explaining that a consumer may not have technological tools, online computer
time, or sufficient computer skills to participate in cyber-mediation or arbitration with
companies who enjoy easy access to these resources).
436 See U.C.C. § 2-316 (2004) (stating rules for enforcing warranty exclusions and
modifications in contracts for sale of goods).
437 See, e.g., Cieslewicz v. Mutual Serv. Cas. Ins. Co., 267 N.W.2d 595, 599-601
(Wis. 1978) (explaining that punitive damages and, to a lesser extent, statutory multiple
damages, aim to punish or deter bad conduct).
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MH safety and promotion of low-income housing are important to public
welfare. Furthermore, statutory damages exclusions are particularly onerous
on MH warranties, and the privacy of arbitration prevents publicity of MH
insiders' abuse of statutory warranty requirements. In this context, it may be
damages and
appropriate for arbitrators to retain power to order statutory
4 38
law.
state
and
federal
remedies provided under applicable
Other remedy limitations that benefit insiders are the carve-outs that MH
lenders include in their form financing agreements. These carve-outs
preserve lenders' rights to seek judicial foreclosure and replevin. Lenders
argue that these carve-outs are fair because lenders can only afford to carry
high-risk MH loans if they retain their rights to quickly foreclose on MHs in
court. It is true that MH borrowers default at higher rates than conventional
mortgagors, and MH repossessions have been escalating. Quick responses,
however, have not aided lenders and manufacturers in recovering losses due
to borrowers' defaults. Instead, lenders should aim to avoid judicial
foreclosure in light of the high costs of repossessing and reselling MHs. This
especially is true when MHs rapidly depreciate in value and loan amounts
exceed MH resale values. Accordingly, policymakers should consider
barring these carve-outs. This seems reasonable, especially if secured lenders
retain rights to privately and peacefully repossess MHs under UCC Article
9.439

6. Access to Class Relief
A controversial issue is whether arbitrators may order class-wide
arbitration. The Supreme Court dodged the question in 2003, and courts
4 40
disagree regarding the enforceability of limits on class relief in arbitration.
Some commentators argue that access to class relief is imperative to allow
consumers and employees to vindicate their statutory rights. 44 1 Many courts

438 See Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights, S. 3210, 106th Cong.
§ 2(c)(2)(B) (2000) (proposing standard requiring the arbitrator be empowered "to grant
whatever relief would be available in court under law or equity," but leaving it unclear
whether this bars companies from precluding access to statutory relief).
439 A secured lender may repossess a MH without judicial action, provided the
lender does not breach the peace-i.e., where a borrower has abandoned the MH, or does
not object or attempt to prevent repossession.
440 See supra notes 161-70 and accompanying text (discussing Bazzle and lingering
questions regarding class arbitration).
441 See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 160, at 105 (proposing that courts should not
enforce arbitration provisions where plaintiffs can show "an arbitral prohibition on class
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and commentators support arbitration agreements' preclusion of class relief,
however, emphasizing the sanctity of contractual liberty. 442
MH consumers often seek class relief in order to assert similar home
defect claims against manufacturers. This allows those without sufficient
resources to. bring claims, and permits small-dollar claimants to initiate
arbitration as a group.44 3 Some complain, however, that consumers abuse
class actions to induce large settlements. 4" Some attorneys also abuse class
relief by encouraging actions to generate attorney fees. 44 5 Indeed there are
many thorny issues for policymakers to consider in deciding whether to
allow for class arbitration in MH cases. 446 This determination also depends
on consumers' responsibility for arbitration fees and costs. Consumers free
from high filing and arbitrators' fees will be more likely to assert statutory
447
and low-dollar claims in individual arbitrations.

actions would deprive them of the opportunity to adequately enforce their statutory
rights").
442 See Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 186 Cal. App. 3d 1309, 1320-21 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1986) (gathering cases and stating this conclusion), superseded by statute as stated
in Villa Milano Homeowners Ass'n v. I1.Davorge, 84 Cal. App. 4th 819, 830 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (applying a new state statute permitting the purchaser to bring construction
claims in court despite an arbitration clause in a real estate purchase agreement, but not
affecting the unconscionability analysis in Izzi).
443 See Stemlight, supra note 160, at 11-15 (noting how class actions allow small
dollar claimants to assert their rights more economically as a group).
444See Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and "Blackmail"
Settlements in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1377, 1380
(2000) (proposing that "class action in the real world is an instrument of abuse and
corruption, either through sweetheart settlements that 'sell out' plaintiffs for a fraction of
the value of their claims, or through blackmail settlements that extort payments from the
defendant in excess of what the claims are really worth"); see generally Sylvia R. Lazos,
Note, Abuse in Plaintiff Class Action Settlements: The Need for a Guardian During
PretrialSettlement Negotiations, 84 MICH. L. REv. 308 (1985) (discussing the abuse of
class relief).
445 See Stephen J. Safranek, Curbing the Fees of the Class Action Lawyers in Light
of City of Burlington, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1301, 1301-02 (1995) (noting how "lawyers
abuse the class action vehicle to generate attorney fees").
446 Consumers also complain that companies routinely remove class actions to
federal courts that "almost always eventually dismiss consumer class actions." Senator
Dodd Explains Class Action Deal, Says Pact Corrects Defects in S.1751, 72 U.S.L.W.
22, at 2344 (Dec. 16, 2003) (discussing consumer objections to a class action reform bill).
447 See supra Part VI.C.3 (discussing caps on consumers' arbitration costs).
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VII. CONCLUSION

MH arbitration is a microcosm of the larger debate regarding the
enforceability and fairness of arbitration contracts in uneven bargaining
contexts. Indeed, the time is ripe for Congress to consider amending the FAA
to impose fairness standards for arbitrations under all non-negotiable form
contracts. This may mean policymakers should take a closer look at the
Consumer and Employee Arbitration Bill of Rights Senator Sessions
proposed in 2000.448

This Article, however, tackles the MH corner of consumer arbitration
because it is in particular need of reform. It is time to require minimum
fairness standards for MH warranty arbitrations in order to protect MHs'
potential as a formidable source for low-income housing. Policymakers
cannot afford to ignore the escalation of MH warranty disputes and attendant
MH foreclosures. The MHIA provides HUD with the opportunity to address
resolution of intra-industry MH warranty disputes. Congress should also
consider taking this opportunity to establish mandatory minimum standards
for resolution of all consumer warranty claims. 44 9 At the very least,
policymakers should seriously examine MH safety concerns and arbitration
regulations aimed to ensure consumers' access to MH warranty remedies.

448 1 am not endorsing the bill. I am merely calling on policymakers to consider
fairness standards that account for the contracting reality of today's consumer contracts.
See generally Jean R. Sternlight, ADR Is Here: PreliminaryReflections on Where it Fits
in a System of Justice, 3 NEV. L.J. 289, 289-304 (2003) (emphasizing the need for
research regarding improvement of ADR, and urging that, although we do not have "all
the answers," we should "be open to new possibilities as we begin to rethink our
approach to procedural justice").
449 See supra Part II (discussing the confluence of factors that burden MH
consumers and threaten MHs' potential in providing affordable housing).
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